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THREE METAPHORS OF NORM 
MIGRATION IN INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT 
Roderick A. Macdonald* 
INTRODUCTION: INTERNATIONAL NORM ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
wo metaphors constantly recur in the activities and scholarship of 
those who promote a regime of global legal norms1: harmonization 
and transplantation.2 More recently a third hads also found scholarly fa-
vor: viral propagation.3 Whichever metaphor is adopted, however, and 
regardless of whether the field is public law and judicial institutions 
(notably, international human rights and the rule of law),4 environmental 
                                                                                                             
 *  F.R. Scott Professor of Law, McGill University. This essay is a revised version of 
the keynote address presented at the symposium Ruling the World: Generating Interna-
tional Norms, held at Brooklyn Law School, October 24, 2008. I should like to thank my 
United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (“UNCITRAL”) colleagues 
Michel Deschamps, Richard Kohn, Jean-François Riffard, Uwe Schneider, Harry Sig-
man, Ed Smith, Catherine Walsh, and Steve Weise for many helpful conversations over 
the years about international commercial law reform. I am especially grateful to Neil 
Cohen for his friendship and generosity in sharing his insights into the themes I develop 
here. The Editors of the Journal have been most gracious in assisting me with the task of 
turning my symposium paper into the present Article. I trust the reader will judge that any 
errors of fact or interpretation (responsibility for which lies with me alone) have been 
made “in good faith and in a commercially reasonable manner.” 
 1. In this Article, I focus on international norm migration as involving the conscious 
efforts of norm entrepreneurs, be they States acting individually or collectively (e.g., the 
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law (“UNIDROIT”)), the agencies of 
which States are members (e.g., UNCITRAL), or private organizations (e.g., the National 
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws). For a discussion of the difference 
between intended norm migration and unintentional norm migration, see Finn Makela, 
The Drug Testing Virus, 43(3) REVUE JURIDIQUE THÉMIS [R.J.T.] (forthcoming 2009) 
(Can.) (examining the northward migration of U.S. legal norms concerning employee 
drug testing to Canada). 
 2. Both harmonization and transplantation have been staples of comparative law 
discourse since the mid-1970s. See, e.g., Marc Ancel, From the Unification of Law to Its 
Harmonization, 51 TUL. L. REV. 108, 114–17 (1976); W.J. Kamba, Comparative Law: A 
Theoretical Framework, 23 INT’L & COMP. L. Q. 485, 501–04 (1974); Alan Watson, Le-
gal Transplants and Law Reform, 92 LAW Q. REV. 79, 79–84 (1976). 
 3. Perhaps the most insightful discussion of the viral propagation metaphor in legal 
circles is the unpublished manuscript by Spencer Weber Waller, The Law & Economics 
Virus 1 (2008) (unpublished manuscript) (available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1017882). 
 4. See generally BEYOND COMMON KNOWLEDGE: EMPIRICAL APPROACHES TO THE 
RULE OF LAW (Erik Jensen & Thomas Heller eds., 2003) (bringing together empirical 
studies of legal and judicial reform from across Asia, Europe, Latin America, and the 
United States); THE MIGRATION OF CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAS (Sujit Choudhry ed., 2006); 
Judith Resnick, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Fede-
ralism’s Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006) (exposing American federal-
T
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law, labor law, or the structural components of the trading economy,5 a 
single conclusion typically follows. Western law, particularly in its 
common law reflections, and specifically in its U.S. common law instan-
tiations, is not just the best available earthly representation of the possi-
bilities; it is the Platonic ideal-type.6 Yet as far as I am aware, the asser-
tion has not actually been put to a meaningful empirical test in many of 
the above fields. It remains a canon of the faith-based international law 
reform congregation, to which even disciples of reality-based constituen-
cies are required to pay tribute. 
My own field of interest, secured transactions law, is not immune from 
this type of theological proselytizing. Again and again one hears that the 
latest revision of Article 9 of the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code 
(“UCC”) is the dialectical endpoint of centuries of experimentation with 
regimes of security on movable property.7 As such, Article 9.38 is neces-
sarily superior to all other models for modernizing the law of commercial 
                                                                                                             
ism as a both an excuse for evading transnational dialogue and a port of entry for norm 
migration in the context of international human rights). 
 5. See generally BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARDS A NEW COMMON SENSE: 
LAW, SCIENCE AND POLITICS IN THE PARADIGMATIC TRANSITION (1995) (critiquing mod-
ern norms as incapable of generating progressive laws for regulating the global econo-
my). 
 6. The literature exploded following HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF 
CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (2000). 
But compare Daniel Berkowitz et al., Economic Development, Legality and the Trans-
plant Effect, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 165 (2003) (arguing that the mode in which the bor-
rowed law was initially transplanted and received is a more important determinant of 
effective legal institutions than the supply of law from a particular legal family), with 
Sigrid Quack, Agency Legal Professionals and Transnational Law-Making: A Case of 
Distributed Agency, 14 ORGANIZATION 643 (2007) (“[I]n the face of weak or ‘loose’ gov-
ernment at the international level, the development of transnational legal norms follows a 
pattern of dispersed rule-setting that is manifested in the common law system and led by 
legal practitioners in large law firms and an internationalized legal profession.”). 
 7. See, e.g., Heywood Fleisig, Secured Transactions: The Power of Collateral, 33 
FIN. & DEV. 44 (1996); Heywood Fleisig & Nuria de la Peña, Law, Legal Institutions and 
Development: Lessons of the 1990s for Property Rights, Secured Transactions, Business 
Registration, and Contract Enforcement (Oct. 2003), reprinted in WORLD BANK, GLOBAL 
INSOLVENCY DATABASE http://siteresources.worldbank.org/GILD/ConferenceMaterial/202 
60806/CEAL_Legal_Lessons%20-%20formatted.pdf. Two recent volumes provide a good 
conspectus of challenges and developments in the North Atlantic trading block. See 
SECURITY RIGHTS IN MOVABLE PROPERTY IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW (Eva-Maria Kie-
ninger ed., 2004), and the essays in Part I of the collection in particular; GERALD MCCOR-
MACK, SECURED CREDIT UNDER ENGLISH AND AMERICAN LAW (2004). 
 8. In order to differentiate the versions of Article 9, I borrow the protocols of com-
puter programs and characterize these official versions as Article 9.1, Article 9.2, and 
Article 9.3. 
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financing worldwide and should serve as a template for both national law 
and transnational legal norms.9 
The failure to test this apostolic creed against the data provided by ri-
gorous scholarly inquiry is, I argue, a fundamental flaw in contemporary 
international norm entrepreneurship, especially in those fields of busi-
ness and commercial law where various versions of “economic analysis” 
reign supreme.10 In the City of God, there may well be an exact coinci-
dence between the ideal and the actual, between norm and action; in the 
City of Man, a somewhat more attenuated relationship is invariably 
present.11 
There is another, procedural defect in the argument for universal legal 
norms that usually escapes the notice of law reformers. Global norm en-
trepreneurs do not take sufficiently seriously their privileged metaphors. 
Because these metaphors are familiar in popular conversation and be-
cause they seem, at least superficially, to plausibly characterize the 
processes for generating transnational legal norms, they lose their an-
chorage in the knowledge fields from which they arise. Divorced from 
their disciplinary contexts, these metaphors become rhetorical slogans,12 
mere ciphers.13 If ever international law reformers were to engage care-
fully with any one of their harmonization, transplantation, and viral 
                                                                                                             
 9. Typical of the Article 9 literature in this respect is Boris Kozolchyk & Dale Beck 
Furnish, The OAS Model Law on Secured Transactions: A Comparative Analysis, 12 SW. 
J. L. & TRADE AM. 235 (2005). 
 10. E.g., Kenneth W. Dam, Credit Markets, Creditors’ Rights and Economic Devel-
opment (Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 281, 
2006), available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/WkngPprs_251-300/281-kd-
credit.pdf. 
 11. I have considered this theme in two recent unpublished conference papers. See 
Roderick A. Macdonald, Exporting Article 9, Presentation at the Jefferson School of Law 
Conference on Globalizing Secured Transactions (Mar. 14–15, 2008) (on file with au-
thor) [hereinafter Macdonald, Exporting Article 9]; Roderick A. Macdonald, Distinguish-
ing “Interest” From “Position”: Negotiating the Modernization of Secured Transactions 
Law in International Trade, Presentation at the Institute of Law and Finance, Johann Wolf-
gang Goethe Universität, Frankfurt, F.R.G. (Apr. 30, 2008) (on file with author). 
 12. Metaphor as rhetorical device—a memorable way to make a point that could be 
made otherwise—is the most usual deployment of metaphors in legal scholarship. Ber-
nard J. Hibbitts, Making Sense of Metaphors: Visuality, Aurality and the Reconfiguration 
of American Legal Discourse, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 229 (1994). Hibbitts is one of very 
few scholars who have theorized the use of metaphors about law by contrast with meta-
phors in law. 
 13. I am, of course, making a broader claim about metaphors in legal discourse. Fol-
lowing Finn Makela, A Viral Model of Legal Norm Migration (Nov. 14, 2008) (unpub-
lished thesis, University of Montreal) (on file with author), I argue that “every metaphor 
is a submerged model.” For an extended development, see Roderick A. Macdonald & 
Jonathan Widell, Office Politics (Again)!, 20 CAN. J.L. & SOC. 1, 5–8 (2005). 
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propagation metaphors and examine their disciplinary detail in music, 
botany, and genetics respectively, they would, I believe, be much less 
optimistic about deeming North American legal artifacts like Article 9.3 
transcendent (that is, good for all times and all places).14 
In support of this claim, I extrapolate from my experiences over a 
twenty-year period as a national law reformer in two civil law jurisdic-
tions, Quebec and Ukraine,15 and from lessons learned during the past six 
years as an international law reformer privileged to serve as a member of 
the Canadian delegation to UNCITRAL Working Group VI: Secured 
Transactions.16 I draw parallels between these three experiences and the 
three metaphors I have identified in an effort to show how global norm 
entrepreneurs selectively choose (and selectively attend to the features 
of) their metaphors in order to validate their often unrealistic expecta-
tions about the receptivity of States to proposals for legislating interna-
tional legal norms as domestic law. The reform process in Quebec was 
driven by the rhetorical logic of harmonization, in Ukraine by the rhetor-
ical logic of transplantation, and at UNCITRAL by the rhetorical logic 
of viral propagation.17 In none of these cases, however, was significant 
effort invested in deriving a viable model of norm migration from these 
metaphors. In none did norm entrepreneurs rely on a theory that would 
                                                                                                             
 14. Too often when borrowed across disciplines, metaphors are stripped of their 
nuance, their equivocation, and their politics. See generally PAUL RICOEUR, THE RULE OF 
METAPHOR: MULTI-DISCIPLINARY STUDIES OF THE CREATION OF MEANING IN LANGUAGE 
65–133 (1977). The point is further elaborated in J. DOUGLAS PORTEOUS, LANDSCAPES OF 
THE MIND: WORLDS OF SENSE AND METAPHOR (1990). The general point about metaphors 
in law is also developed by Waller, supra note 3, at 6–7. 
 15. Between 1985 and 1989, I served on a Ministerial Working Group charged with 
drafting articles for what became Book VI: Prior Claims and Hypothecs of the CIVIL 
CODE OF QUÉBEC [C.C.Q.], R.S.Q., ch. 64, arts. 2644–2802 (1991) (proclaimed in force 
Jan. 1, 1994). In 2003 and 2004, I served as an external Consultant to the World Bank 
and assisted in the drafting of what became the Ukraine Law on Securing Creditors’ 
Claims and the Registration of Encumbrances Law No. 1255-IV, Nov. 18, 2003, Vido-
mosti Verkhovnoyi Rady Ukrainy [V.V.R.] [Official Bulletin of the Supreme Council of 
Ukraine] 2004, No.11, p.140 (Ukr.) (proclaimed in force Jan. 8, 2004), available at 
http://zakon.nau.ua/eng/doc/?uid=3020.360.0 [hereinafter Charge Law]. 
 16. See Working Group VI, 2002 to Present: Security Interests, http://www.uncitral. 
org/uncitral/en/commission/working_groups/6Security_Interests.html (last visited Apr. 19, 
2009) [hereinafter 2002 to Present: Security Interests]. 
 17. In the oral presentation of this Article, I also used these three metaphors more gen-
erally to explore the framing of the three panels of the Symposium, thereby illustrating their 
analytical power. International organizations (panel I) are habitually engaged in an endeavor 
that can be captured by the metaphor of legal transplants; transnational epistemic commu-
nities (panel II) are constituted in a logic of harmonization; and the notion of an evolution 
from global soft law to global hard law (panel III) evokes an image of viral propagation. 
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have enabled them to judge the success or failure of their work against a 
template of testable hypotheses.18 
To put the matter slightly differently, whether the law reform objective 
is to generate international legal norms located within the legal regimes 
of States or to generate international legal norms located within the sys-
tem of international or transnational commercial law, the endeavor is 
similar. The fundamental questions of norm creation and norm migration 
do not change simply because the scope and scale of the legal order in 
question differ.19 
Before discussing these experiences in detail, I should like to enter two 
caveats. First, my observations about the metaphors and practices of 
global law reform are to be understood analytically, not polemically. All 
three metaphors carry with them symbolic baggage. Without further spe-
cification, the idea of harmonization resonates positively—harmony is 
preferable to disharmony. Without further specification, the idea of 
transplantation is rather neutral—positive perhaps, if a life-saving organ 
transplant, less positive if it involves the introduction of a foreign species 
that destroys an indigenous habitat. Without further specification, the 
idea of viral propagation evokes a negative consequence—a viral disease 
pandemic. I ascribe no such symbolism to these metaphors. In this Ar-
ticle, my aim is simply to reflect on how effectively these metaphors cap-
ture the mode of norm migration at issue. 
My second disclaimer pertains to the substantive field of inquiry. My 
reflections on the manner in which international norm entrepreneurs have 
promoted the reform of secured transactions law are in no way intended 
to denigrate Article 9.3 or its predecessors. Article 9 in all its versions is 
a remarkably successful legislative endeavor, and its key policies are 
widely acknowledged as capturing the central premises and core prin-
ciples that should be pursued in any reform of secured transactions.20 
Still, success (even extraordinary success) in one domestic legal order is 
                                                                                                             
 18. On the importance of modeling metaphors, see MAX BLACK, MODELS AND 
METAPHORS: STUDIES IN LANGUAGE AND PHILOSOPHY (1962). 
 19. The point has long been standard currency among legal pluralists, although its 
impact in the field of international commercial law reform is minimal. On norm migra-
tion in a legal pluralistic context, see the essays in LE DROIT SOLUBLE: CONTRIBUTIONS 
QUÉBÉCOISES À L’ÉTUDE L’INTERNORMATIVITÉ [SOLUBLE LAW: QUEBEC’S CONTRIBUTIONS 
TO THE STUDY OF INTERNORMATIVITY] (Jean-Guy Belley ed., 1996) [hereinafter SOLUBLE 
LAW]. 
 20. This is confirmed by the principles many international organizations have identi-
fied as key to secured transactions reform. For one attempt to state these principles co-
gently, see WORLD BANK, PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR EFFECTIVE INSOLVENCY AND 
CREDITOR RIGHTS SYSTEMS (Apr. 2001), http://www.worldbank.org/ifa/ipg_eng.pdf [he-
reinafter WORLD BANK, PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES]. 
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no guarantee of success elsewhere. Such success does, however, provide 
a good benchmark for inquiring into the conditions for successful law 
reform and the why and how of mitigated success. 
Article 9 remains an enigma for many jurists outside common law 
North America. Jurists from States that have not adopted the basic pri-
vate law institutions of Western Europe typically find the esoteric voca-
bulary and conceptual structure of Article 9 to be curious.21 Those 
trained in the civil law find Article 9 to be slightly schizophrenic in de-
sign. After all, none of its key structural features are conceptually new: 
the idea of a security right as a nonpossessory charge on property is far 
from foreign to the civil law tradition.22 But the sweeping up of title 
transactions into the general concept of security, particularly in cases 
involving vendors that retain title to the property sold, suggests incohe-
rence. How can one be both the owner of property and the titulary of a 
security right in the same property?23 Of course, one must be careful not 
to overstate these points. On the one hand, many States have not adopted 
basic institutions of Western law, whether because of political theory (in 
socialist regimes), theology (in Islamic republics) or traditions (in some 
Asia-Pacific nations). Jurists from each can be expected to have their 
own differentiated reactions to Article 9, deriving from the particular 
assumptions of their different legal regimes. Moreover, the civil law tra-
dition, like the common law tradition, is not a monolith. It would be in-
correct to affirm that the secured transactions regimes in Quebec, France, 
Germany, Italy, and various States in Central Europe and Latin America 
are equally hospitable to the underlying logic of Article 9.24 Even less are 
                                                                                                             
 21. Roderick A. Macdonald, Presentation at the AALS Conference on Commercial 
Law at the Crossroads: Have I Got a Law for You . . . (June 14–17, 2005), outline avail-
able at http://www.aals.org/2005midyear/commercial/RoderickMacdonaldOutline.pdf. 
 22. Classical Roman law knew of the nonpossessory charge—hypotheca—on mova-
ble property fourteen centuries before the chattel mortgage emerged in common law 
countries. See R.W. LEE, THE ELEMENTS OF ROMAN LAW 175–78 (4th ed. 1956). The 
prohibition on the hypothecation of movables was a later development that did not fun-
damentally alter the civilian concept of hypothecation as a debtor-in-possession charge 
on property. See Pierre Crocq, L’évolution des garanties du paiement: de la diversité à 
l’unité [The Evolution of Payment Guarantees: From Diversity to Unity], in 2 MÉLANGES 
CHRISTIAN MOULY [A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS IN HONOR OF CHRISTIAN MOULY] 317 
(1998) (Fr.). 
 23. For a comprehensive discussion of the problem, see JEAN-FRANÇOIS RIFFARD, LE 
SECURITY INTEREST OU L’APPROCHE FONCTIONNELLE ET UNITAIRE DES SÛRETÉS MOBILIÈRES: 
CONTRIBUTION À UNE RATIONALISATION DU DROIT FRANÇAIS [THE SECURITY INTEREST OR 
THE FUNCTIONAL UNITARY APPROACH TO SECURITY ON MOVEABLE PROPERTY: CONTRIBU-
TION TO A RATIONALIZATION OF FRENCH LAW] (1997) (Fr.). 
 24. For a subtle treatment of the diversity of different legal traditions, and the diversi-
ty within such traditions, see H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD (2d 
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they equally hospitable to the particular mechanisms by which this logic 
is reduced to the specific legal norms of Article 9.3.25 
In both substance and form, Article 9 is the necessary product of a 
common law regime that never fully developed the generic concept of a 
security right as a “legal cause of preference,” embracing consensual and 
nonconsensual hypothecations, charges, liens, and possessory pledges. 
Substantively, and consistent with the evolution of the common law 
mortgage over land, Article 9 relativizes title according to the purposes 
of its deployment: a creditor’s or vendor’s ownership does not comprise 
the full prerogatives of ownership where title is used to secure the per-
formance of an obligation. In form, Article 9 does not set out a general 
concept by which the “essential” characteristics of the various transac-
tions it regulates may be identified. So, for example, it does not define 
the generic idea of a “security right.” While Article 9 does incorporate 
the definition of a “security interest” provided in Section 1-201(35),26 
this definition is under-specified. Consequently, many types of transac-
tions that could be functionally understood to create a security interest 
have been excluded from the scope of Article 9 by judicial interpreta-
tion.27 At the same time, many types of transactions that are not func-
tionally secured transactions under the opening sentence of the definition 
                                                                                                             
ed. 2004). See also H. Patrick Glenn, A Concept of Legal Tradition, 34 QUEENS L.J. 427 
(2008). 
 25. Commentators generally acknowledge that Article 9.3 is much more responsive to 
the particular features of secured financing in the United States and that its detailed rules 
and definitions diminish its suitability as a template for international secured transactions 
reform. See, e.g., Ronald C.C. Cuming & Catherine Walsh, Revised Article 9 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code: Implications for the Canadian Personal Property Security Acts, 
16 BANKING & FIN. L. REV. 339 (2000). 
 26. U.C.C. § 1-201(35) (2001) (“‘Security interest’ means an interest in personal 
property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation. ‘Security 
interest’ “includes any interest of a consignor and a buyer of accounts, chattel paper, a 
payment intangible, or a promissory note in a transaction that is subject to Article 9. ‘Se-
curity interest’ does not include the special property interest of a buyer of goods on iden-
tification of those goods to a contract for sale under Section 2-401, but a buyer may also 
acquire a ‘security interest’ by complying with Article 9. Except as otherwise provided in 
Section 2-505, the right of a seller or lessor of goods under Article 2 or 2A to retain or 
acquire possession of the goods is not a ‘security interest,’ but a seller or lessor may also 
acquire a ‘security interest’ by complying with Article 9. The retention or reservation of 
title by a seller of goods notwithstanding shipment or delivery to the buyer under Section 
2-401 is limited in effect to a reservation of a ‘security interest.’ Whether a transaction in 
the form of a lease creates a ‘security interest’ is determined pursuant to Section 1-203.”). 
 27. Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Exami-
nation of the Scope of Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REV. 175 (1983). This article remains one of 
the best explorations of this theme. 
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of Section 1-102(35) have been added to the scope of Article 9; and 
many legal devices not caught under any conceivable definition of a se-
curity interest are included within the regulatory framework of Section 9-
109(a).28 
The discomfort of jurists outside common law North America with Ar-
ticle 9 can also be traced to its pragmatic, remedy-oriented structure and 
its highly-detailed, fact-driven drafting style—both features that particu-
larly grate upon those who appreciate the notion of a code.29 For many, 
Article 9.3 in particular is the antithesis of a code; it is anti-conceptual, 
written in a technical style, and not integrated within a syncretic frame of 
private law such as a civil code. 
To shed light on the source of these misgivings about Article 9, I 
should like to conclude this Introduction by situating the law of secured 
transactions within its broader intellectual context.30 Conceptually, the 
genus security right (including the species security interest) can only be 
fully understood within the regime governing the compulsory enforce-
ment of obligations (or what in common law systems is conventionally 
called debtor-creditor law). In contemporary Western legal traditions, 
whether Continental civil law or Anglo-American common law, four 
principles underpin debtor-creditor law. The first principle, which we 
now take as a given, but which really only achieved its status as a prin-
ciple in the nineteenth century with the abolition of debtor’s prison, is 
that judgments are to be executed against property, not persons. The 
second principle is that the preferred creditor’s remedy for nonperfor-
mance of an obligation is not to coerce specific performance, but rather 
to seek performance by equivalence, in the form of a judicial determina-
tion of money damages. The third principle (the common pledge of 
creditors) is that the entire patrimony of a debtor is liable for these debts. 
That is, the law presumes that what people own secures what they owe, 
and that any creditor is entitled to seek satisfaction of an unperformed 
obligation by seizing and selling however much of its debtor’s exigible 
estate is required to satisfy the debt. The fourth principle is now unders-
tood in common law systems more as a feature of insolvency law, al-
though in civil law systems it remains a feature of debtor-creditor law. 
Should the assets of a debtor be insufficient to pay all creditors with un-
paid obligations, the money received from the sale of these assets will be 
                                                                                                             
 28. See U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(2)–(4) (2000). 
 29. On the key features of a code as a juristic technique, see QUEBEC CIVIL LAW: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO QUEBEC PRIVATE LAW 98–111 (John E.C. Brierley & Roderick A. 
Macdonald eds., 1993). 
 30. For an elaboration of this context, see PIERRE CROCQ, PROPRIÉTÉ ET GARANTIE 
[PROPERTY AND SECURITY] (1995) (Fr.). 
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distributed ratably (pari passu) among these creditors, unless the law 
gives their claim a priority status (a preference). 
Once these features of debtor-creditor law are clearly articulated it is 
easier to grasp the basic logic of a security right and to see why an Ar-
ticle 9 security interest is only one species of the larger genus. This logic 
can be expressed as follows: 
A security right is constituted by (1) the specific and purposive affecta-
tion of property (2) to the satisfaction of a debt, (3) in a manner that 
improves the legal situation of an ordinary creditor (4) by attenuating 
the principle that an insolvent debtor’s entire estate is the common 
pledge of creditors in which all creditors share pari passu.31 
A security right may be consensual or nonconsensual. It may be a right in 
corporeal or incorporeal property. It may affect individual assets or a 
universality. It may attach to movable or immovable property. It need not 
be a right in assets, but may simply be a right in their proceeds. It need 
not generate an execution preference. It need not involve the rendering of 
assets into money. It may involve the direct payment of the debt by subs-
tituted performance.32 
Of course, simply noting these features of the generic concept of a se-
curity right does not, in any meaningful sense, tell us how they may be 
instantiated in any particular legal regime. Nor does it tell us how legal 
ideas circulate or the mechanisms by which international norm entrepre-
neurs seek to sell their product in a globalized economy. These are the 
issues I address in the three following Sections of this Article.33 I consid-
er in turn the dominant metaphors that capture the objectives of each of 
the three secured transactions law reform endeavors with which I have 
been associated over the past three decades.34 While the discussion is 
                                                                                                             
 31. This definition is drawn from Roderick A. Macdonald & Jean-Frédérick Ménard, 
Credo, credere, credidi, creditum: Essai de phénoménologie des sûretés réelles [A Phe-
nomenological Study of Security on Property], in MÉLANGES OFFERTS AU PROFESSEUR 
FRANÇOIS FRENETTE: ÉTUDES PORTANT SUR LE DROIT PATRIMONIAL [ESSAYS IN HONOR OF 
PROFESSOR FRANÇOIS FRENETTE: STUDIES IN PATRIMONIAL RIGHTS] 309 (2006) (Can.). 
 32. Doctrinal commentators in France have been particularly thoughtful in working 
through the subtleties of the generic idea of a security right. See, e.g., JACQUES MESTRE 
ET AL., DROIT COMMUN DES SÛRETÉS RÉELLES [COMMON LAW OF SECURITY ON PROPERTY] 
1–10 (1996) (Fr.); Michel Cabrillac & Christian Mouly, DROIT DES SÛRETÉS [SECURITIES 
LAW] 1–19 (6th ed. 2002) (Fr.). 
 33. I have discussed many of these points in two other recent articles. See Roderick 
A. Macdonald, Article 9 Norm Entrepreneurship, 43 CAN. BUS. L.J. 240 (2006) [hereinaf-
ter Macdonald, Norm Entrepreneurship]; Roderick A. Macdonald, In Praise of the Hypo-
thecary Charge, 7/8 DECITA 287 (2007). 
 34. In this Article, I do not address the complementary question of whether there can 
(and should) be international legal norms that are proper to an international legal order 
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broadly cast, I pay particular attention to issues of scope: how does each 
law reform project address the deployment of title to secure the perfor-
mance of an obligation?35 My conclusion raises the more general issues 
of formalism and functionalism as strategies of international law reform 
and situates the endeavor within the larger context of ethical theory. 
I. HARMONIZATION: THE NAIVETY OF EQUAL TEMPERAMENT 
My first example, meant to illustrate the use and abuse of the metaphor 
of harmonization by international commercial law norm entrepreneurs, is 
drawn from the process of civil code revision in Quebec. 
Exactly what does the metaphor of harmonization imply?36 For most 
jurists it means reforming the law of one State to bring it into accord with 
the law of another State. The assumption is that there already exists a 
desired theme or melody, and that some discordant melody needs to be 
rewritten so that it is in harmony with the existing, desired theme. Other 
jurists see the challenge as bilateral. Harmonization implies that the ex-
isting theme or melody may have to be changed in order to better ac-
commodate the harmonic efforts of others. Here, the assumption is that 
the goal is to find the best set of policies and principles (whether or not 
there is actually an existing legal regime that reflects these policies and 
principles) and to adopt these policies and principles as the guiding mo-
tifs for legislative drafting in all receiving States. In both hypotheses, 
however, there is a presupposition that harmony rather than discord is 
desirable, and that harmony will always produce substantive compatibili-
ty.37 
                                                                                                             
conceived as such, and that derive their first-order legitimacy from legitimating structures 
other than States. That is, I do not consider either so-called legislated international legal 
norms deriving from international treaties and conventions or nonlegislated international 
legal norms deriving from practice, contract, or everyday interaction. For a brief discus-
sion of the theoretical ground for such developments in the idea of legal pluralism, see 
Roderick A. Macdonald, Metaphors of Multiplicity: Civil Society, Regimes, and Legal 
Pluralism, 15 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 69 (1998). 
 35. A broad overview of the alternatives in common law and civil law regimes may 
be found in Michael G. Bridge et al., Formalism, Functionalism, and Understanding the 
Law of Secured Transactions, 44 MCGILL L.J. 567 (1999). 
 36. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, “harmonization” is the “action or 
process of harmonizing”—meaning the reduction to harmony or agreement; reconciliation. 
See Oxford English Dictionary Online, Harmonization, http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/ 
entry/50102729?single=1&query_type=word&queryword=harmonization&first=1&max_to_ 
show=10 (last visited Apr. 19, 2009). 
 37. For an extended discussion of harmonization through law reform, see Martin 
Boodman, The Myth of Harmonization of Laws, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 699 (1991). I leave 
aside collateral issues such as whether it is necessary to achieve rhythmic coherence as 
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A. The Process of Civil Code Revision in Quebec 
To test the utility of the harmonization metaphor I commence with 
several observations about the unique socio-political context of Quebec 
commercial law. An initial point is that Quebec is a predominantly 
French-speaking jurisdiction in a commercial law world dominated, until 
recently even in Quebec, by English. Moreover, except in matters of con-
stitutional and public law, Quebec is a civil law jurisdiction, but finds 
itself surrounded by States having common law legal systems. Third, 
even though its political economy and governance institutions would 
place it among States characterized in the United States as verging on 
socialist, in comparison with most European States, Quebec would be 
seen as having a relatively unregulated North American market econo-
my. Again, notwithstanding a significant operative overlay of common 
law-influenced federal commercial law in matters such as banking, bank-
ruptcy, negotiable instruments, interest regulation, and intellectual prop-
erty, basic conceptions of property and obligations have retained the cen-
tral features of the French civil law tradition. Fifth, this private law of 
property and obligations is expressed in the style and form of the Na-
poleonic (Code civil français), not the German (Burgerlichesgesetzbuch) 
codification. Finally, Quebec’s Civil Code Revision Office (“CCRO”) 
began a process of modernizing its private law in the 1950s—that is, at 
the same time the UCC enactment project was getting off the ground in 
the United States—even though the CCRO submitted its report and Draft 
Civil Code (“DCC”) only in 1977,38 and the reformed Civil Code of 
Québec (“CCQ”) did not actually come into force until 1994.39 These six 
features bear greatly on how the specific reform of secured transactions 
took shape in Quebec. 
When the provincial government published the DCC in 1978, the in-
spiration of Article 9 was evident in the Title on Security on Property.40 
Throughout the previous decade, the CCRO Committee on Security on 
Property had sought, in modernizing the 1866 Civil Code of Lower Can-
                                                                                                             
well, and whether harmonization implies the possibility that reform might involve a “var-
iation” on the primary theme. 
 38. See CIVIL CODE REVISION OFFICE, 2 REPORT ON THE QUÉBEC CIVIL CODE (1977) 
(Can.) [hereinafter REPORT ON THE CCQ]. 
 39. On that lengthy process of codal reform, see QUEBEC CIVIL LAW: AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO QUEBEC PRIVATE LAW, supra note 29, at 84–97. 
 40. The Chair of the Committee on Security on Property, Yves Caron, often acknowl-
edged the influence of Article 9. See, e.g., Yves Caron, L’Article 9 du Code Uniforme de 
Commerce peut-il être exporté? Point de vue d’un Juriste Québecois [Is Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code Exportable? Viewpoint of a Quebecois Jurist], in ASPECTS OF 
COMPARATIVE COMMERCIAL LAW 374 (J. Ziegel & W. Foster eds., 1969). 
614 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 34:3 
ada (“CCLC”), to harmonize Quebec commercial law with Article 9.2 
and its Canadian derivatives, the Personal Property Security Acts.41 Sen-
sitive to the nationalist political undertones of Quebec’s ongoing “Quiet 
Revolution,” the Committee carefully avoided the word “unification”42 in 
elaborating its proposals. It did, however, expressly adopt the general 
conception of a security interest found in Article 9. The DCC was sub-
mitted just following the election of a government committed to with-
drawing Quebec from the Canadian Confederation. As a result, other 
matters (including a sovereignty referendum) took precedence, and the 
CCRO proposals languished for almost a decade. In early 1985, howev-
er, once again following an election, the new non-separatist government 
announced that enacting a reformed Civil Code would be a priority. A 
number of expert committees were formed to consider the text of the 
DCC. 
Between 1985 and 1989, I served as a member of a Working Group of 
the Quebec Ministry of Justice charged with examining the CCRO’s rec-
ommendations relating to security on property and the registration of 
rights. Because the DCC dealt with security on both movable and im-
movable property, the representatives of the legal professions on the 
Working Group included both commercial and real estate practitioners, 
and more importantly, both advocates (lawyers) and notaries. While the 
former in each pairing were generally favorable to the DCC proposals, 
the latter expressed five major concerns. First, in extending the concept 
of the hypothec to movables (especially to universalities of present and 
future movables), the DCC appeared to attenuate significantly the prin-
ciple of the hypothec’s “specific affectation” and the requirement of a 
notarial deed to constitute a hypothec. Second, in characterizing all forms 
of movable security as hypothecs, the DCC undermined the particularity 
of rules governing the creation, third-party effectiveness, priority, and 
enforcement of the existing panoply of movable security devices—
pledges, assignments of receivables, corporate trust deeds, floating 
charges, special nonpossessory pledges, transfers of property in stock, 
etc.—a detailed knowledge of which constituted much of the expertise 
and intellectual capital of the profession. Third, the DCC proposed 
broadly opening secured credit to consumers by permitting debtor-in-
possession security over movable property. Fourth, the DCC proposed an 
                                                                                                             
 41. See REPORT ON THE CCQ, supra note 38, at 346–72. 
 42. Curiously, among Quebec jurists, there seems less resistance to the specific word 
(independent of its conceptual content) when associated with international organizations 
like UNIDROIT, the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, than with 
a national organization like the ULCC, the Uniform Law Conference of Canada in Eng-
lish, but La conférence pour l’harmonisation des lois au Canada in French. 
2009] THREE METAPHORS 615 
extended conception of real subrogation for security rights that would 
mirror the Article 9 proceeds rule. Finally, the DCC adopted a functio-
nalist logic for rationalizing transactions (including all title transactions) 
intended as security through a mechanism it labeled the “presumption of 
hypothec.”43 
More than anything else, it was the presumption of hypothec that 
raised the suspicion of doctrinal heresy. Despite the care of the CCRO to 
use the expression harmonization, many jurists saw the specter of unifi-
cation in this proposal. Part of the difficulty lay in the fact that the pre-
sumption of hypothec idea departed from the procedural logic that had 
previously driven secured transactions reform in Quebec. That is, rather 
than follow a well-known regulatory technique, according to which par-
ticular formalities for creation, third-party effects, and enforcement of 
security were overlaid on existing transactions,44 the idea of the presump-
tion of hypothec was to adopt an unfamiliar deeming logic, under which 
even title transactions would be legislatively recharacterized as hypo-
thecs (implying that title would vest for all purposes in a debtor, who 
would be deemed to have granted a security right to the creditor).45 So, 
                                                                                                             
 43. CIVIL CODE REVISION OFFICE, 1 DRAFT CIVIL CODE [D.C.C.], arts. 281–85 (1977) 
(Can.). The CCRO described its work as involving the horizontal and vertical integration 
of security rights. Vertical integration was meant to signal that different rules for crea-
tion, third-party effectiveness, priority, and enforcement of existing security rights would 
be brought together in a common frame; horizontal integration was meant to signal that 
all legal devices serving to secure the performance of an obligation would be considered 
security rights. See Yves Caron, La Loi des pouvoirs spéciaux des corporations et les 
recommandations de l’office de revision du Code civil sur les sûretés réelle [The Special 
Corporate Powers Act and the Civil Code Revision Office’s Recommendations on Securi-
ty on Property], in W.C.J. MEREDITH MEMORIAL LECTURES: LEGAL ASPECTS OF CORPOR-
ATE DEBT FINANCING 82 (1976). 
 44. For example, this was the approach taken in 1938 with the amendment of Articles 
1535 et seq. of the Civil Code of Lower Canada, and in 1964 with the addition of Articles 
1040a-1040e to the CCLC. The technique is widespread, and can be found, most evident-
ly, in statutes like the Consumer Protection Act, R.S.Q. c. P-40.1, s. 15 (2009). Paradoxi-
cally, this is a law reform technique more familiar to the common law (consider equity’s 
maxim “once a mortgage always a mortgage”) and, even more paradoxically, was exactly 
that adopted by the drafters of Article 9. 
 45. The differences between the “substance of the transaction” approach of Article 9 
and the deeming logic of the “presumption of hypothec” are reviewed in Roderick A. 
Macdonald, Faut-il s’assurer d’appeler un chat un chat? Observations sur la méthodolo-
gie législative à travers l’énumération limitative des sûretés, ‘la présomption 
d’hypothèque’ et le principe de ‘l’essence de l’opération’ [Is It Always Better to Make 
Sure That We Call a Cat a Cat? Observations on Legislative Method in Relation to the 
Numerus Clausus of Security Rights, the “Presumption of Hypothec,” and the Principle 
of the “Substance of the Transaction”], in MÉLANGES GERMAIN BRIÈRE 527 (Ernest Ca-
parros ed., 1993) (Can.) [hereinafter Macdonald, Observations]. Paradoxically, in view of 
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for example, installment sellers would be deemed to be secured creditors, 
and installment purchasers would be deemed to be owners who had 
granted vendor’s security; buyers under a sale with a right of redemption 
would be deemed to be lenders, and sellers under a right of redemption 
would be deemed to be borrowers. 
After almost four years of study and debate, the Working Group came 
to the conclusion that it would not take the DCC as the starting point for 
its recommendations to the Minister. It proposed an entirely different 
legislative framework—the Avant-projet de loi of 1989—that harkened 
back to the logic of the CCLC.46 For present purposes, the most profound 
change was the decision to abandon a general presumption of hypothec. 
The CCQ did enact a presumption of hypothec in so far as traditional 
security devices were concerned, recasting and recharacterizing all forms 
of existing security as hypothecs; however, it did not extend this rationa-
lization to title security.47 Instead, it proposed a transaction-specific, and 
not altogether identical, regulation of only some title devices, those that 
are the most common, installment sales, sales under resolutory condition, 
sales with a right of redemption, finance leases, and security trusts.48 At 
the end of the day, the text of Book 6 of the CCQ, Prior Claims and Hy-
pothecs, was derived directly from the recommendations of the minis-
terial working group and its Avant-projet de loi, not from the proposals 
contained in the DCC.49 Understanding why this occurred is instructive 
for assessing the limits of the metaphor of harmonization in international 
commercial law reform. 
In my view, there were two key factors at play: ideology and ignor-
ance. Ideologically, the DCC proposals were interpreted as entirely too 
much of a break from the civil law tradition. Ironically, this interpreta-
tion derived more from the CCRO’s presentation of its recommenda-
tions, which considered security on property a new departure meant to 
                                                                                                             
the resistance to the presumption of hypothec idea, this technique is a more accurate ref-
lection of traditional civil law methodology. 
 46. The Avant-projet was never enacted but was introduced into the National Assem-
bly as Bill 106 of 1989. For discussion of the process, see Roderick A. Macdonald, The 
Counter-Reformation of Secured Transactions Law in Quebec, 19 CAN. BUS. L.J. 239 
(1991) [hereinafter Macdonald, Counter-Reformation]. 
 47. See C.C.Q., R.S.Q. arts. 2674, 2660, 2664–65 (1991). In other words, the CCQ 
adopted the concept of vertical integration of security devices as proposed by the CCRO, 
but did not at the same time adopt the concept of horizontal integration of security devices. 
 48. The regulation of these different devices in the CCQ is discussed in detail in 
Macdonald, Observations, supra note 45, at 572–91. 
 49. The process by which the Avant-projet was then translated into Book 6 of the 
CCQ is discussed in Roderick A. Macdonald, Change of Terminology? Change of Law?, 
23 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT 357 (1992). 
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modernize, rationalize, and harmonize Quebec law with laws being 
enacted by other North American jurisdictions, than from the actual con-
tent of the regime it proposed. So, for example, because the DCC was 
described as being compatible with Article 9, the Minister of Justice and 
others immediately (and incorrectly) declaimed the presumption of hypo-
thec as a common law incursion into the civil law. As noted, however, 
the presumption of hypothec was a typically civilian way of addressing a 
problem that Article 9 had dealt with in a procedural, pragmatic, and cha-
racteristically Anglo-American fashion.50 The orthodox civil law approach 
has been to deploy characterization as a regulatory tool.51 So, while one 
might describe the Article 9 approach as “if it quacks like a duck and it 
walks like a duck, treat it like a duck,”52 the DCC approach could be de-
scribed as “if it quacks like a duck and it walks like a duck, it is a 
duck.”53 Unfortunately, the Minister and his advisers incorrectly believed 
that the presumption of hypothec was an example of U.S. legal imperial-
ism aimed at unification of law; and in the name of harmonization, they 
proposed a regime that conceptually followed the logic of unification 
(even if this was unconscious) while rejecting an approach that sought a 
genuine harmonization respectful of the civil law tradition. 
                                                                                                             
 50. While Article 9.1 clearly did not operate a recharacterization of title security—
that is, it did not for all purposes deem a title-reservation sale to involve an outright sale 
with a vendor’s mortgage back—but merely imposed a regulatory overlay for issues of 
creation, third-party effectiveness, enforcement, and priorities, it is an open question 
whether Article 9.3 and judicial interpretation have now effectively transformed the idea 
of a security interest into a deeming provision of the type envisioned under the presump-
tion of hypothec. See Bridge et al., supra note 35, at 621–26. 
 51. A classic example of the approach can be found in the manner in which courts 
treated attempts to overcome the traditional prohibition on the hypothecation of mo-
vables. See CIVIL CODE OF LOWER CANADA [C.C.L.C.] art. 2022 (Sharp 1889). Where 
parties deployed a double sale mechanism—outright sale by the borrower to the lender 
combined with an installment sale from the lender back to the borrower—Quebec courts 
consistently declared these transactions to be disguised “movable hypothec” and refused 
enforcement to the lender. See, e.g., Rousseau v. Bélanger [1952] B.R. 772 (Qué.). 
 52. The principle flows from § 9-109(a), “Except as otherwise provided in subsec-
tions (c) and (d), this article applies to: (1) a transaction, regardless of its form, that 
creates a security interest in personal property or fixtures by contract.” U.C.C. § 9-109(a) 
(2000). See also id. § 1-201(35) (2001) (“‘Security interest’ means an interest in personal 
property or fixtures which secures payment or performance of an obligation.”). 
 53. D.C.C. art. 281 (Can.). (1) No person may assert a right to property in order to 
secure payment of an obligation, except by way of hypothec. (2) Any stipulation the ef-
fect of which is to preserve or confer a right to property in order to secure payment of an 
obligation is a stipulation of hypothec. (3) It may only preserve or confer a hypothec in 
favour of the creditor, subject to the formalities required for constitution and publication 
of hypothecs. 
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The second factor leading to rejection of the DCC was related less to 
notions of legal and conceptual integrity than to “facts on the ground.” 
Because much of the Quebec commercial law of the 1950s to 1980s was 
contained in extra-codal statutes enacted as exceptions to the regime ela-
borated in the CCLC, at the time the DCC saw the light of day, Quebec 
private law legal culture was neither familiar with nor amenable to the 
assumptions underlying the CCRO proposals. That is, atavisms of Civil 
Law thinking, uninfluenced by decades of modernization in commercial 
legislation, colored the general professional reception of the DCC. On 
the basis that it constituted a radical departure from existing law, several 
jurists opposed the very idea of a regime of security on property aimed at 
facilitating consensual transactions where (1) the principle of numerus 
clausus of multiple distinctive transactions was not respected; (2) credi-
tors would be permitted to take nonpossessory security over all manner 
of movable assets—corporeal and incorporeal, specific assets and un-
iversalities, present and future assets—granted by all manner of debtor 
(including those not carrying on an enterprise); (3) creditors could exer-
cise self-help enforcement remedies; and (4) the supervisory role of 
courts would be ex post facto, rather than ex ante. Close comparison of 
the DCC with existing Quebec commercial practices, of course, belies 
each of these presuppositions.54 
Not surprisingly, therefore, the CCQ remains an incomplete reform. 
The most glaring deficiencies can be located in two main areas. Most 
importantly, the regime governing title transactions remains poorly 
worked out. Although the DCC proposal to enact a presumption of hypo-
thec was not pursued in the CCQ, the National Assembly could not simp-
ly ignore the problem posed by extensive use of title-security such as 
installment sales. So, using the blueprint that it sketched out in the 
CCLC, the National Assembly decided to maintain a distinction between 
title transactions and security devices and to overlay the former with a 
number of procedural mechanisms meant to protect a debtor’s equity. 
But this approach was ad hoc, and no attempt was made to comprehen-
sively think through the implications of this bifurcated approach. The 
CCQ does not conceptualize all title transactions as instantiations of one 
of four logical types: vendor title retention (e.g., sale under suspensive 
                                                                                                             
 54. For a detailed discussion, see Macdonald, Norm Entrepreneurship, supra note 33. 
Perhaps, strategically, the CCRO could have been more accommodating of these con-
cerns. For example, it could have proposed a new term like security right to embrace the 
existing inventory of security rights denominated as pledges, hypothecs, trust deeds, fidu-
ciary transfers of property-in-stock, conditional assignments, sales with a right of re-
demption, retention-of-title devices, and financial leases, rather than relabel all these 
devices as hypothecs. 
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condition, installment sale, or lease), vendor title resolution (e.g., reven-
dication of thirty-day goods, or resolutory clauses), creditor acquisition 
and retention of title (e.g., sale with a right of redemption, double sales, 
or sale leaseback), and creditor title-suspensive acquisition or transfer of 
title (e.g., giving-in-payment clauses). Instead, it identifies the paradig-
matic (and most familiar) device among the various specific transactions 
falling within each of these logical types, and imposes, apparently upon 
this device alone, certain procedural mechanisms. As a result, the legisla-
ture implicitly invited inventive parties to create transactions falling just 
outside the scope of the regulated type—a maneuver that, absent judicial 
sensitivity to excessive formalism, permits the regulatory regime to be 
easily subverted.55 It would be possible to solve most of these problems 
by implementing a single functional approach for true security and a 
four-fold functional approach for title transactions falling within each of 
the four categories. 
The second deficiency is that the CCQ was not conceived with the fi-
nancing practices of a 1990s commercial economy in mind. One might 
say that the CCQ more closely resembles Article 9.1 of 1954 than it does 
Article 9.3. Thus, while the CCQ contemplates the hypothecation of 
share certificates, securities, negotiable instruments, incorporeal business 
assets, intellectual property, debentures, partnership shares, investment, 
and mutual funds and like assets, its regulatory regime is rudimentary. 
The CCQ contains no special priority rule like that found in Article 9, 
which privileges “publicity by possession” over “publicity by registra-
tion” in respect of negotiable instruments, securities, and documents; nor 
does it provide for “publicity by control” in respect of deposit accounts.56 
Another indication of the Code’s uneasy relationship with contemporary 
commercial finance can be found in its enforcement regime. The proce-
dures for realizing upon security are heavily laden with ex ante controls, 
reflecting the kinds of considerations that might properly come into play 
in relation to security on immovable property, but that are less appropri-
                                                                                                             
 55. For example, even though sales under suspensive condition produce almost identical 
consequences to installment sales, the former are currently unregulated while the latter are 
closely assimilated to the hypothec for the purposes of registration, enforcement upon de-
fault by the purchaser, and priorities. C.C.Q. arts. 1745–49. A similar nominalistic legisla-
tive strategy was pursued in Articles 1040(a)–(e) of the CCLC (which was added in 1964 
by An Act to Protect Borrowers Against Certain Abuses and Lenders Against Certain 
Privileges, S.Q. 1964, ch. 67, art. 1), with predictable consequences. It was only with the 
decision of a nine-member bench of the Quebec Court of Appeal in Nadeau v. Nadeau, 
[1977] C.A. 234 (Qué.), that courts stopped reading these Articles as a closed list of regu-
lated transactions and began to interpret them as implying a general principle. 
 56. Part of this may be explained by commercial financing practices in Canada. See 
Cuming & Walsh, supra note 25. 
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ate in a regime of security on movables.57 But, just as Article 9 has been 
subject to adjustment, one might presume that similar adjustments will 
occur with the CCQ.58 Still, the story of its initial enactment has much to 
teach about how the metaphor of harmonization can illuminate (and oc-
clude) the process of international commercial law reform. 
B. The Logic of Harmonization 
Let me now return to the rhetoric that underlies appeals to harmoniza-
tion in international commercial law reform: unification is bad; harmoni-
zation is good.59 As a legal pluralist, I have no difficulty with the first 
affirmation. But I should like to go further by marking the limits of the 
harmonization metaphor. With very few exceptions, global norm entre-
preneurs believe that harmonization is an appropriate metaphor to de-
scribe the process of achieving comity in secured transactions law. Is it? 
What guidance does it really give as to how to effectuate international 
commercial law reform? 
Consider the following illustration.60 The key harmonic principles of 
Western music are derived from ratios: unison = 1:1; octave = 2:1; fifth = 
3:2; fourth = 4:3; major third = 5:4. In theory, if you start with any note 
and tune through the circle of fifths, you should get back to where you 
began (e.g., A–E–B–F#–C#–Ab/G#–Eb–Bb–F–C–G–A), and this pro-
gression of twelve fifths should produce the same note as seven octaves. 
However, it does not. 3:2 to the twelfth power equals 129.746; 2:1 to the 
                                                                                                             
 57. Currently, by contrast to the immediate possession regime of UCC Article 9, 
CCQ Article 2758 requires an enforcing creditor to give a twenty-day (or, in the case of 
consumer transactions, thirty-day) prior notice of an intention to exercise a hypothecary 
recourse against movable property. Where a debtor is carrying on an enterprise and the 
property is susceptible to rapid deterioration, the prior notice may be dispensed with alto-
gether. In such cases, the notice would be post-possession and would be intended merely 
to inform the debtor and third parties of the specific realization recourse that the creditor 
intends to pursue. 
 58. So, for example, the National Assembly has just enacted amendments to the CCQ 
to provide for the third-party effectiveness of hypothecs over intermediated securities to 
be obtained by control. See An Act Respecting the Transfer of Securities and the Estab-
lishment of Security Entitlements, R.S.Q. 2008, c. 20, s. 136 (2008) (adding Articles 
2714.1–14.7 to the CCQ). 
 59. For comprehensive studies grounded in this metaphor and published by the De-
partment of Justice, Canada, see THE HARMONIZATION OF FEDERAL LEGISLATION WITH 
THE CIVIL LAW OF THE PROVINCE OF QUEBEC AND CANADIAN BIJURALISM, available at 
http://justice.gc.ca/eng/dept-min/pub/hfl-hlf/table.html. Compare this with the critical 
perspective of Arthur Rosett, Unification, Harmonization, Restatement, Codification, and 
Reform in International Commercial Law, 40 AM. J. COMP. L. 683 (1992). 
 60. The illustration is taken from ROSS W. DUFFIN, HOW EQUAL TEMPERAMENT RUINED 
HARMONY (AND WHY YOU SHOULD CARE) 15–45 (2007). 
2009] THREE METAPHORS 621 
seventh power equals 128.000. The dissonance with octaves is worse if 
we take the progression cycle of major thirds. 
To overcome these dissonances musicians developed the theory of 
temperament. That is, because the triad C–E–G# (an augmented chord in 
the key of C major) is not the same as the triad C–E–Ab (an augmented 
chord in the key of Ab major), a violin must be slightly retuned depend-
ing on the particular key in which a piece is being played. The four violin 
strings, if played open, will not sound exactly right in all keys. Yet, even 
though tuning to a particular key with a perfect instrument (for example, 
a stringed instrument that permits strings to be stopped precisely where a 
violinist wishes, by contrast with a fretted instrument like a guitar that 
predetermines where strings are stopped) will resolve most of these dis-
sonances, it will never overcome the root dissonance produced when oc-
taves are compared with major fifth and major third cyclical progres-
sions. With nonperfect instruments such as pianos, the problem is worse 
since each note is given a fixed cycles per second regardless of the key in 
which one plays. That is, even though pianos are constructed so that C# 
and Db are played by touching the same key, neither is an exact reflec-
tion of, say, the major fifth in the key of Gb (Db) or the major third in the 
key of A (C#). 
This accommodation to the practical limits of the piano does not mean, 
however, that the tonal difference, for example, between C and C#/Db, 
C#/Db and D, D and D#/Eb, needs to be the same. Dividing the octave 
into twelve equally-spaced tonal units (equal temperament) is only one 
way of tuning an instrument. Over the past half a millennium, some 150 
different methods for tempering instruments have been devised. None are 
exact.61 And none can overcome the dissonance produced because the 
mathematical ratios by which we produce octaves, major fifths and major 
thirds cannot be reconciled, even when an instrument is tuned for a sin-
gle key. While something akin to perfect harmony may be imagined in a 
single key (except for the discords at either end of the circle of major 
fifths or generally in relation to major thirds), and an instrument tuned to 
play almost perfect harmony within a narrow octaval range,62 it can be 
                                                                                                             
 61. A pianist can tell by hearing, for example, “Mary Had a Little Lamb” played suc-
cessively in the keys of D  and G what adjustments to equal temperament the piano tuner 
had made. For example, the tuner may have slightly modulated the note F /G  so that it 
shades towards the F , with the consequence that when the song is played in D  it sounds 
slightly more discordant than when the piano is tuned so that the F /G  note is equidis-
tant from F and G. 
 62. That is, the small differences that appear when a full cycle of fifths or thirds is 
compared with octaves are barely perceptible when a piece is played entirely within a 
two- or three-octave range. 
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neither played nor imagined where a piece changes keys. In fact, the only 
perfect harmonies available are those of unison and its mirror, octave. 
The central question for international law reformers who like the musi-
cal metaphor, therefore, is not simply one of harmonization.63 It is also 
one of temperament: what tuning (legislative) compromises do we make 
in order to achieve something like harmony, and why do we make these 
choices in the places that we do? Before we naively throw around meta-
phors that sound good when stripped of their complexity in the field from 
which they arise, or conversely, before we abandon these metaphors be-
cause they do not seem to provide the simple rhetorical punch we wish, 
we should consider whether those field-specific complexities may actual-
ly help us to better understand the law reform project to which we are 
applying the metaphor. More precisely, a richer understanding of the me-
taphor of harmonization enables us to attend to three important tempera-
ment variables: instrument, key, and range. 
I believe that these variables, and the fundamental hypotheses about 
secured transactions law reform in relatively developed commercial 
economies they illuminate, are nicely illustrated by the CCQ reform 
process. A first point is this: there can never be perfect harmony regard-
less of how closely two States may resemble each other. Each State is an 
instrument, with its particular manner of tuning and its particular built-in 
harmonic compromises. The more stable the political and legal environ-
ment (as in a fretted or valved instrument), the more the doctrinal atav-
isms of conservative legal scholarship and traditional legal practice are 
able to derail reforms that threaten acquired intellectual capital by invok-
ing the specter of unification and by purporting to defend the presumed 
essence of the existing legal order. The rejection of the presumption of 
hypothec in Quebec can be seen as evidence that imperfect instruments 
(fretted guitars, valved trumpets, or holed clarinets) should not be trans-
formed into perfect instruments (unfretted violins, or slide trombones), 
since tuning compromises are inherent to the instruments themselves.64 
                                                                                                             
 63. I adopt fully the critique of harmonization as a goal for law reform advanced by 
Boodman, supra note 37, and pursue the general logic of that critique in developing the 
idea of temperament. 
 64. This is not to say that no accommodation is possible. Experienced players can re-
tune their instruments or more pragmatically stretch strings to modulate pitch. Experienced 
law reformers can do likewise, in the manner suggested in the paragraph following this 
footnote. In Quebec, a useful comparison might be drawn between two monographs writ-
ten by and for practicing commercial lawyers, and two monographs written by professors 
for students. For the former, see JOHN B. CLAXTON, SECURITY ON PROPERTY AND THE 
RIGHTS OF SECURED CREDITORS UNDER THE CIVIL CODE OF QUEBEC (1995); LOUIS 
PAYETTE, LES SÛRETÉS RÉELLES DANS LE CODE CIVIL DU QUÉBEC [SECURITY ON PROPERTY 
IN THE CIVIL CODE OF QUEBEC] (2d ed. 2001) (Can.). For the latter, see PIERRE CIOTOLA, 
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Secondly, the richest harmonies are often contrapuntal and call forth an 
extended tonal range. They work because they provide an alternative 
melody, which follows its own logic and thematic development. Unfor-
tunately, the more that entrenched local norm entrepreneurs have suc-
cessfully exercised political power in the past, the more likely it is that 
they will defeat proposals for legal reform that threaten to disrupt exist-
ing spheres of influence by opening up market sectors to new actors. The 
rejection of non-vendor purchase-money security interests can be seen as 
instantiating the point that the broader the tonal range of a legal concept, 
the less acute the contrapuntal harmonies may be.65 
Thirdly, all temperaments privilege certain keys (whether major or mi-
nor), certain melodic progressions, and certain dominant instruments (for 
example, violins, trumpets, clarinets, guitars, and saxophones). Follow-
ing the general themes of Donald Black,66 even when legislative temper-
ing ex ante fails to protect these previously dominant instruments, the 
choice of key can significantly influence the manner in which any partic-
ular piece of music is played and the relative harmonics of the perfor-
mance. The rejection of an extensive proceeds rule is an example of the 
dialectical quality of true harmony reflected in different keys.67 
From the perspective of 2009, the drafters of Book 6 of the CCQ ma-
naged to produce a remarkably successful law reform product. Without 
the benefit of any other civil law precedent, they were able to achieve 
                                                                                                             
DROIT DES SÛRETÉS [THE LAW OF SECURITIES] (3d ed. 1999) (Can.); DENISE PRATTE, 
PRIORITÉS ET HYPOTHÈQUES [PRIORITIES AND HYPOTHECS] (2d ed. 2005) (Can.). The for-
mer are much more attuned to experimentation and making things work in practice; the 
latter to explicating and defending the presumed intellectual heritage of Quebec civil law. 
 65. Article 2954 of the CCQ provides that the hypothec of the vendor of movables 
will outrank a prior registered hypothec over a universality of future property charging 
the type of asset sold, but does not extend the vendor’s hypothec to nonvendor acquisi-
tion financiers. While Article 9 purportedly applies the temporal priority rule to all pur-
chase-money security interests (“PMSIs”), in fact the primacy of title reemerges in Sec-
tion 9-324(g), which gives vendor PMSIs priority over even prior-registered lender 
PMSIs. 
 66. DONALD BLACK, SOCIOLOGICAL JUSTICE (1989). 
 67. U.C.C. § 9-102(64) (2000) defines “proceeds” to include numerous items that in 
traditional civil law thinking would not be captured by the theory of real subrogation. 
Insurance monies, damages payments, replacement property, and receivables arising 
upon disposition (see paragraphs A, D, E) are of this character; but fruits, revenues, divi-
dends, products, and the offspring of animals or of reseeded plants (see paragraphs B, C) 
are not. The approach of the CCQ permits debtors to fractionate new property from exist-
ing assets while maintaining the creditors’ rights in initially encumbered assets, acces-
sions, manufactured property, commingled property, and true proceeds. For a discussion 
of these distinctions in relation to security rights, see Roderick A. Macdonald, Fruit Sal-
ad, 38 REVUE GÉNÉRALE DE DROIT 405 (2008). 
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both modernization and rationalization of the law of secured transactions 
in a manner that embraced corporeal and incorporeal movable property, 
consensual and nonconsensual security, possessory and nonpossessory 
security, execution preferences, non-judicial enforcement, and a notice-
filing publicity regime, while at the same time regulating the major title 
transactions deployed to secure the performance of obligations. If there 
are still unresolved issues, they do not revolve around the failure to im-
plement the presumption of hypothec as recommended by the CCRO. 
Rather, they reflect a failure to recall the wisdom of temperament. Simp-
ly because the CCQ was tempered to preserve title security ought not to 
have meant that it had to be tempered so that harmony would be 
achieved only by certain instruments, played in certain keys over a li-
mited tonal range. 
II. TRANSPLANTATION: THE VULGARITY OF LEGAL HORTICULTURE 
My second example, drawn from the process of secured transactions 
reform in Ukraine, illustrates the use and abuse of the metaphor of trans-
plantation by international commercial law norm entrepreneurs. 
Again, I begin by asking what exactly the metaphor of transplantation 
implies.68 For most jurists it means reforming the law of one State by 
importing into it the law of another State. The assumption is that there is 
a relative autonomy of legal artifacts that permits them to be easily trans-
ferred from one context to another. Other jurists see the challenge as 
more contextual. As law is a product of social forces, there will always be 
the need for adaptation, whether ex ante or ex post. Here, the assumption 
is that acculturation is a central feature of successful legal adaptation. In 
both hypotheses, however, there is a presupposition that transplantation 
is beneficial and that the biological precautionary principle, which pro-
poses that transplants may be harmful assaults on biodiversity, is inap-
plicable.69 
                                                                                                             
 68. According to the Oxford English Dictionary, “transplantation” is “the action of 
transplanting”—meaning the removing of a plant from one place or soil and planting it in 
another. See Oxford English Dictionary, Transplantation, http://dictionary.oed.com/cgi/ 
entry/50256486?single=1&query_type=word&queryword=transplantation&first=1&max_to_ 
show=10 (last visited Apr. 12, 2009). 
 69. For an extended discussion, see William. Ewald, Comparative Jurisprudence (II): 
The Logic of Legal Transplants, 43 AM. J. COMP. L. 489 (1995); Pierre Legrand, The 
Impossibility of “Legal Transplants,” 4 MAASTRICHT J. EURO. & COMP. L. 111 (1997); 
J.M. Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History and Ar-
gentine Examples to Explain the Transplant Process, 51 AM. J. COMP. L. 839 (2003); 
David Nelken, Legal Transplants and Beyond: Of Disciplines and Metaphors, in COMP-
ARATIVE LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY 19 (Andrew Harding & Esin Orucu eds., 2002). 
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A. The Development of the Charge Law in Ukraine 
To test the utility of the transplantation metaphor, I begin with the ef-
forts of the government of Ukraine since independence in 1989 to enact a 
modern secured transactions regime. In the 1990s, the Ukraine Ministry 
of Finance and the World Bank signed an agreement establishing the Ru-
ral Finance Project. This initiative went well beyond rural finance and 
was intended to provide Ukraine with a basic legislative infrastructure 
governing areas as diverse as mortgage law, land registration, secured 
transactions, debenture lending, insolvency, bankruptcy, corporate finance, 
securities regulation, and so on. In relation to security on movable prop-
erty, the idea was to modernize the law along the lines of the core prin-
ciples enunciated by the World Bank and the Model Law on Secured 
Transactions of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(“EBRD”).70 This modernization was to be accomplished by enacting a 
new secured transactions law that reformed the rules set out in both the 
Civil Code of Ukraine (“CCU”) and a more recently adopted Pledge Law 
and that, for the first time, permitted debtor-in-possession pledges of 
movables. 
Early in 2003, in a first reading the Ukraine Parliament adopted a se-
cured transactions law prepared as part of the Rural Finance Project by 
the Center for the Economic Analysis of Law (“CEAL”).71 This law was 
largely a copy of a similar statute adopted in Romania several years ear-
lier,72 a law that was itself little more than a transcription of Article 9.73 
                                                                                                             
 70. See WORLD BANK, PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES, supra note 20; EUR. BANK FOR 
RECONSTR. & DEV., MODEL LAW ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS (2004), available at http://www. 
ebrd.com/pubs/legal/secured.pdf. 
 71. For further information about the legislative reform projects, see: Center for the 
Economic Analysis of Law, http://www.ceal.org (last visited Apr. 19, 2009). 
 72. Law Regarding Some Steps to Speed Up Economic Reform, Law No. 99, May 
26, 1999. This law was a project of the Word Bank (International Bank for Reconstruc-
tion and Development), and is presented and discussed in Nuria De la Peña & Heywood 
W. Fleisig, Romania: Law on Security Interests in Personal Property and Commentaries, 
29 REV. CENT. & E. EUR. L. 133 (2004). As well as serving as the model for the initial 
secured transactions law in Ukraine, Article 9 (as instantiated in Romanian law) inspired 
the Law Amending the Civil Code, Notarial Law and Other Laws, adopted by the Slovak 
Republic on August 19, 2002, and the Law on Registered Charges on Movable Assets, 
Law No. 57/2003, adopted by the Republic of Serbia on May 30, 2003, available at 
http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/law/st/core/pledge/serbia.pdf (unofficial English trans-
lation provided by the Serbian Ministry for International Economic Relations). For dis-
cussion of the former law, see EUR. BANK FOR RECONSTR. & DEV., GUIDE FOR TAKING 
CHARGES IN THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC (2003), available at http://www/ebrd.com/pubs/legal/ 
slovak.pdf. 
 73. It is important to signal that there are important differences of opinion about the 
possible role of Article 9 in international secured transactions reform. Some see in it a 
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After the first reading, broad consultations with relevant stakeholders 
revealed that the proposed legislation was unlikely to take root in 
Ukraine. In part, this was because it did not cohere with basic civil law 
principles. But a more important factor was that, in conception, style of 
drafting, scope, and ambition, it had little resonance with either Ukrai-
nian legal culture or on-the-ground practices. The World Bank then con-
tracted with two local lawyers to revise the law for presentation to the 
Parliament for a second reading in July. I was asked to comment on an 
early version of the revision and then to come to Kiev to assist the lawyers 
in fine-tuning the draft and to consult with other professionals—bankers, 
business leaders, public officials, and lawyers—who had taken a special 
interest in the project.74 
These consultations led to a number of policy conclusions about the 
form and content of the redraft. Given that a second, post-socialist Civil 
Code had only recently been enacted, we felt we could not insert the 
reform directly into the CCU. Moreover, the Pledge Law that the 
Ukraine Parliament had also recently enacted modified many provisions 
of the Civil Code. Consequently, we determined that the new law would 
have to be drafted as a targeted overlay upon these two existing enact-
ments and that it would only address a few key issues: the scope of secu-
rity rights; certain inter partes and third-party effects of security; publicity; 
priorities; and enforcement.75 
Second, given that broad contractual experimentation with all types of 
nonpossessory rights in movable property was rampant in the legal pro-
fession, even in domains well outside the traditional compass of secured 
transactions law, we felt that the new law should seek to provide some 
transparency about all nonpossessory rights in movables. Consequently, 
                                                                                                             
ready-made template; others, a flexible set of principles and institutions; still others, an 
inventory of “best practices” from which States might reasonably pick and choose de-
pending on other law then in force. Much of the difficulty with the transplantation efforts 
of certain international organizations is that the “model laws” being proposed are, as in 
the case of Ukraine, typically offered on an all-or-nothing basis. See Gunther Teubner, 
Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law Ends up in New Diver-
gences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11, 31–32 (1998). 
 74. By the time I became associated with the project, it had already been decided that 
the North American regime of security on movable property to be imported as a model 
was that of Quebec and not Article 9. Indeed, my involvement (as an English-speaking 
Quebec professor of civil law as well as common law secured transactions) was probably 
predicated upon this basic policy decision. 
 75. While we took the approach of Article 9 as a general template, we did not purport 
to modify basic rules relating to the creation of security rights or the basic pre-default 
rights and obligations of parties, which continued to be governed by the CCU and the 
Pledge Law. 
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we proposed a publicity, priority, and enforcement regime to embrace 
not just traditional consensual security rights, title transactions, ordinary 
assignments, consignments, and long term leases, but also all nonconsen-
sual security rights and all interests in movables that encumber an own-
er’s rights (for example, usufructs) whether or not intended or deployed 
as security.76 
Third, given a widespread perception of unreliability and delays within 
the civil justice process, we felt the need to provide for the possibility of 
a complementary (alternative) regime of private arbitration, which would 
also directly produce enforceable third-party effects and be combined 
with significant ex ante debtor-protection mechanisms to forestall ag-
gressive foreclosures and realizations. Consequently, we concluded that 
(1) the term “court” should be defined broadly so as to include accredited 
private arbitrators, (2) creditors should be required to give prior notice of 
their intention to enforce their security, and (3) creditors should be en-
titled to enforce it judicially without having to proceed through the state 
execution service.77 
Fourth, we felt that the primary need of Ukraine was for a regime that 
dealt with security over equipment, inventory, and receivables. Conse-
quently, we thought that the legislative framework should be designed 
primarily with these assets in view. Even through drafted so as to govern 
security rights in all manner of movable property, it was not so finely 
tuned as to provide detailed regulation of security on second-generation 
incorporeal rights, negotiable documents, deposit accounts, and intellec-
tual property.78 
Taking these factors into account, while still attempting to accommo-
date concerns about imposing unknown legal concepts as a derogatory 
overlay to the CCU and the Pledge Law, we concluded that we could not 
simply “fix” the CEAL draft, but would have to begin afresh. An entirely 
                                                                                                             
 76. In coming to this decision we were mindful that, for analogous reasons, Section 
9-109(a)(3)–(4) extended coverage to all consignment transactions, whether intended as 
security or not, and sales of payment intangibles. In the Canadian Personal Property Se-
curity Act law, the extension goes even further, embracing as well all “leases of more 
than [twelve] months.” See Personal Property and Security Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P-10, 2. 
2(c). 
 77. Article 2 of the Charge Law, supra note 15, defines “court decision” as including 
a “decision, decree, and order of a court, a commercial court, an arbitration tribunal, a 
foreign court or arbitration.” Article 27 provides for advance notice, and Article 30 pro-
vides for nonjudicial creditor enforcement. 
 78. But see id. art. 16 (on priority given to creditors in possession of securities subject 
to a security right); id. art. 33 (on enforcement against money or securities). Nor did the 
law seek to address security over immovables, or even basic principles governing immobili-
zation (attachment) or mobilization (crops, trees, mines, oil and gas, etc.). 
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new law, entitled Law on Securing Creditors’ Claims and the Registra-
tion of Charges (“Charge Law”), that was more in line with the existing 
conceptual structure of domestic law was drafted in June 2003, enacted 
in September 2003, and proclaimed in force in January 2004, and be-
came fully effective when the computerized registry was made opera-
tional in August 2004.79 
Because law reform through legal transplants is a common strategy in 
the field of secured transactions, especially when States are seeking not 
just to modernize or rationalize existing law, but to radically change an 
entire legal regime, it is possible to identify a number of particular fea-
tures that shape success or failure in this endeavor. Indeed, the expe-
rience in Ukraine nicely illustrates why attending to economics, social 
practices, legal structures, and political decision-making is a prerequisite 
to successful commercial law reform and, concomitantly, why the meta-
phor of transplant needs to be understood more richly than is currently 
the case. 
To begin, notwithstanding almost seven decades of “socialist legality,” 
civil law conceptual distinctions between real rights and personal rights 
and between owing and owning remained central in legal thinking. In 
particular, jurists in Ukraine were not prepared to adopt a unitary “sub-
stance of the transaction rule” that would attenuate these distinctions for 
publicity and enforcement purposes. While the need to regulate title 
transactions was accepted, attachment to the idea of ownership, which 
had been suppressed for a long time, prevented its conceptual relativiza-
tion for purposes of secured transactions law.80 As a result, and in order to 
prevent strategic instrument choice by debtors and creditors, the Charge 
Law was elaborated around a newly-minted generic concept, “charge.”81 A 
charge was defined broadly to include traditional security rights in a deb-
tor’s assets (secured charges); other consensual limitations on an owner’s 
rights, whether or not securing the performance of an obligation (contrac-
tual charges); and nonconsensual limitations on an owner’s rights (public 
                                                                                                             
 79. For a detailed discussion of the features of the law as it was enacted, see 
RODERICK A. MACDONALD, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF UKRAINE: ON SECURING 
CREDITORS CLAIMS AND REGISTRATION OF ENCUMBRANCES, at pt. II (2004) (Ukr.) [herei-
nafter MACDONALD, LAW OF UKRAINE]. 
 80. The reaction to the “law and economics” approach reflected in the initial proposals 
by CEAL is strong evidence that certain concepts have untouchable status in particular 
States at particular times: law is not simply an independent variable, and legal doctrine is 
not fungible. For an excellent analysis of this point, see Peer Zumbansen, Comparative 
Law’s Coming of Age? Twenty Years After Critical Comparisons, 6 GERMAN L.J. 1073 
(2005). 
 81. The Ukrainian word for “charge” is sometimes translated alternatively as “en-
cumbrance,” with no intended difference in meaning. 
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charges).82 In addition, rather than explicitly denominating a single securi-
ty device and repealing existing CCU and Pledge Law devices like posses-
sory and nonpossessory pledges, the Charge Law simply provided for a 
number of mandatory rules relating to scope, publicity, priorities, and en-
forcement on various existing legal institutions.83 Finally, although these 
formalities roughly track those of ordinary security, the charge regime 
differentiates certain rights and recourses according to the character of 
the transaction in question—that is, where title is located at any particu-
lar moment in the transaction—in order to acknowledge the specificity of 
conditional ownership and to ensure a functional equivalence of out-
comes.84 In other words, in keeping with its civil law heritage, the 
Ukraine Charge Law acknowledges the difference between title devices 
and security devices by conceptually grouping all manner of title transac-
tions (installment sale, sale under resolutory condition, sale with a right of 
redemption, giving-in-payment clause) together on the one hand, and con-
ceptually grouping all manner of security devices (pledges, rights of reten-
tion, hypothecs) together on the other. The Charge Law has the additional 
merit of comprehensively tracing out the specific consequences of this 
conceptual grouping within the framework of title transactions, rather than 
                                                                                                             
 82. Charge Law, supra note 15, art. 4 (Types of Encumbrances). Thus, the Charge 
Law has broader coverage than both Article 9 and the CCQ. Unlike Article 9, but like the 
CCQ, it includes nonconsensual security devices; unlike the CCQ, but like Article 9, it 
includes consignments, ordinary leases, and outright assignments of receivables; and 
unlike both Article 9 and the CCQ, it includes all limitations on an owner’s rights, includ-
ing lesser proprietary interests like usufructs and leases, and public encumbrances like 
servitudes and state liens. 
 83. Thus, the Charge Law conceives the concept of “charge” the way Article 9 con-
ceives the concept of “security interest.” The term is a linguistic shorthand for the recha-
racterization of disparate legal institutions for the specific purposes of the Charge Law, 
but does not imply the creation of a new legal institution for any other purpose (save 
perhaps bankruptcy, to the extent Ukraine bankruptcy law may later be amended to rec-
ognize the notion of a “charge”). 
 84. Thus, one has to be careful with vocabulary in describing the effect of the Charge 
Law. Here is an example of an operational difficulty caused by the way that “chargor” 
and “chargee” are defined. In ordinary security, and in cases where a creditor has a con-
tingent future ownership right, the chargor is the debtor; but where there is an installment 
sale or a lease, the chargor is the creditor, since the encumbrance falls upon the property 
of the creditor. It follows that if the seller were to sell under an installment sale, it would 
be a chargor, but if it were to transfer title and take a charge over the property sold, it 
would be a chargee. During deliberations about the law, it was suggested that the defini-
tions should be linked to who has physical detention of the encumbered asset. But adopt-
ing this approach would mean that a pledge in possession would be a chargor, where a 
pledgee in cases where the pledgor retained possession would be a chargee. Given the 
decision to include all proprietary rights (including principal real rights) under the regula-
tory regime, these ambiguities of terminology are inevitable. 
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leaving some types of title security unregulated, some only partially regu-
lated, and some confusingly regulated.85 
A second issue facing law reformers was to decide the mechanics by 
which the Charge Law could be rendered operational. Some of the in-
stincts and practices of a market economy and some of the basic concep-
tions of the rule of law were not reflected in Ukraine’s property, con-
tracts, and judicature regimes. Moreover, the uneven sophistication of the 
legal profession and judiciary in matters of secured financing argued 
against conferring substantial discretion upon courts to police ex post 
“good faith and commercial reasonableness” and argued in favor of ex 
ante “bright line non-waivable structuring rules” and mandatory, fill-in-
the-blank contractual forms. Finally, it was important to account for how 
the enforcement system worked in practice. Considerable collateral reform 
was required in order to rework the system of judicature so as to permit 
consensual realization. Because it routinely took three to four years to 
obtain a money judgment and a further year to obtain enforcement, and 
because there was no expedited procedure to obtain interim and interloc-
utory orders, the law provided for alternatives to the public enforcement 
mechanisms.86 
Notwithstanding this general overhaul of the law of security on movable 
property, the Charge Law remains an incompletely achieved reform. 
From a contemporary vantage point, there are probably two areas where 
further improvements might be made. As a stand-alone, first-generation 
secured transactions law, the Charge Law mainly targets basic business 
and consumer property—corporeal movables such as equipment and in-
ventory, accounts receivable, and consumer durables. Once experience 
with the law accumulates, one might imagine that it will undergo an evo-
lution similar to that of Article 9; rules relating to deposit accounts, intel-
lectual property, letters of credit, and other specific transactions will be 
inserted into its general framework, and the entire law will probably be 
inserted into the UCC. 
Moreover, it would probably be expedient for lawyers, registrars, and 
judges to become more familiar with the new regime, and to gradually 
replace the ex ante regulation of creditor recourses with a structure that 
gives greater scope for party autonomy, subject to ex post facto judicial 
review on a standard of good faith and commercial reasonableness. And 
                                                                                                             
 85. The points raised in this paragraph reflect important differences between the Quebec 
and Ukraine regimes that exhibit not only the different socio-economic-political-legal cul-
tures of the two countries, but also the fact that the Charge Law is an improved, second-
generation statute that irons out some of the wrinkles that persist in first-generation civil law 
modernization regimes like that of the CCQ. 
 86. Charge Law, supra note 15, art. 27. 
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in doing so, the law might streamline the publicity regime so that it is 
minimalist in its informational requirements and permits direct remote 
access for filing and searching. This said, in comparison with the pre-
reform law and with the CEAL draft, the Charge Law must be counted as 
a success. Moreover, the story of its enactment offers many lessons about 
how the metaphor of transplantation can contribute to a better under-
standing of international commercial law reform. To these lessons I now 
turn. 
B. The Logic of Transplantation 
The transplantation metaphor is another favorite of those involved in 
international commercial law reform: for many the mantra is grafts are 
bad, transplants are good.87 Here again, I have no difficulty with the first 
affirmation. But I find that the transplant metaphor is typically misap-
plied. In my view, it is better to talk of the “circulation” of legal ideas 
and the “irritation” they inevitably cause,88 two metaphors that imme-
diately suggest the paradoxes of inter-normative transfers.89 Nonetheless, 
given the prevalence of the transplant metaphor, I should like to suggest 
how careful attention to the nuances of horticulture and botany might 
actually assist in understanding processes of international commercial 
law reform. 
Recall the fundamental distinction in botanical sub-disciplines between 
those that consider a plant as an organism separate from the milieu in 
which it grows and those that see a plant as dependent upon its milieu.90 
                                                                                                             
 87. As noted, the use of the metaphor in law can be traced to Watson, supra note 2. 
Since then it has had remarkable currency among comparative lawyers. The metaphor has 
not gone unchallenged, however, especially by “comparative functionalists” writing in 
the tradition of legal sociology. See, e.g., Pierre Legrand, What ‘Legal Transplants’?, in 
ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES (David Nelken & Johannes Feest, eds., 2001); David Nel-
ken, Towards a Sociology of Legal Transplants, in ADAPTING LEGAL CULTURES, supra; 
Edward M. Wise, The Transplant of Legal Patterns, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 1 (1990); 
William Twining, Generalizing About Law: The Case of Legal Transplants, The Tilburg-
Warwick Lectures: General Jurisprudence (Nov. 2000–May 2001) 1, available at http://www. 
ucl.ac.uk/laws/jurisprudence/docs/twi_til_4.pdf. For brief histories of the debate, see Rich-
ard G. Small, Towards a Theory of Contextual Transplants, 19 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 
1431, 1432–39 (2005). 
 88. Teubner, supra note 73, at 12. 
 89. For discussion of this theme, see Roderick A. Macdonald, Les Vieilles Gardes:. 
Hypothèses sur l’émergence des normes, l’internormativité et le désordre à travers une 
typologie des institutions normatives [Old Guards: Thoughts on the Emergence of Norms, 
Inter-normativity and Disorder Through A Typology of Normative Institutions], in 
SOLUBLE LAW, supra note 19, at 233, 233–72. 
 90. For brief introductions to the distinction, see generally JAMES D. MAUSETH, 
BOTANY: AN INTRODUCTION TO PLANT BIOLOGY 10–13 (4th ed. 2008) (on “Plants Versus 
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In the former group can be ranged anatomy, physiology, genetics, and 
taxonomy—or should we say legal concepts, legal institutions, legal 
rules, and legal classification? In the latter may be ranged elements of 
ecosystem analysis, soil, climate, existing flora and fauna, etc.91 As ap-
plied to law, this type of analysis focuses on economic, legal, social, po-
litical, and pragmatic components of a functioning system.92 While these 
analogies are helpful, much may also be gained by exploring how botany 
understands the mechanics of successful transplantation. Here the lex-
icon includes as exogenous objectives beauty and gene diversity; and as 
endogenous objectives photosynthesis, reproduction, symbiosis, and evo-
lution. In law we translate these concerns by asking how acculturation 
can be facilitated through administrative precedents and formularies, 
case reports, doctrinal commentary, and formalized legal education. 
And so arises the central question for international law reformers seek-
ing to introduce countries that heretofore have not had economies in 
which security on movable property formed a significant part of the legal 
universe to the universe of Article 9: what counts as success in legal 
transplantation? To measure success, we should consider a more nuanced 
metaphor of transplantation that accounts for three key botanical va-
riables: physiology and genetics, ecosystem analysis, and time. 
Typically jurists have taken a reductionist approach to the question of 
success: either the transplant survives, or it dies. Botanists tell us, how-
ever, that a finer-grained evaluation framework is possible: (1) trans-
plants can only be measured as successful or unsuccessful depending on 
the objectives sought to be accomplished through the transplant; (2) even 
when those objectives are fully attained, a transplant may produce perni-
cious consequences in other domains; (3) the perspectives and aspira-
tions of the evaluator impact how the data is collected and interpreted; 
(4) the time period during which the evaluation takes place affects the 
assessment; (5) success or failure often depends on how one evaluates 
the transplant’s subsequent adaptations to its milieu; and (6) different 
criteria are deployed depending on whether the transplantation is organic, 
                                                                                                             
the Study of Plants”); MURRAY W, NABORS, INTRODUCTION TO BOTANY (2004) (hig-
hlighting four major themes: plants and people, conservation biology, evolution, and 
biotechnology). 
 91. See generally WALTER LARCHER, PHYSIOLOGICAL PLANT ECOLOGY: ECOPHYSIOL-
OGY AND STRESS PHYSIOLOGY OF FUNCTIONAL GROUPS (4th ed. 2003) (examining the 
science of plant life as affected by various abiotic and biotic factors). 
 92. I have attempted to address each of these components in Macdonald, Norm En-
trepreneurship, supra note 33; Roderick A. Macdonald, Unitary Law Re-form, Pluralistic 
Law Re-substance: Illuminating Legal Change, 67 LA. L. REV. 1114 (2007) [hereinafter 
Macdonald, Illuminating Legal Change]. 
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natural, and voluntary, or disjunctive, artificial, and involuntary.93 Once 
again, the inescapable conclusion is that, before we vulgarly take on 
board complex metaphors from other disciplines, or conversely, before 
we abandon these metaphors because they do not seem to provide the 
simple rhetorical punch we wish, we should attend to the deep theory of 
the disciplinary knowledge we seek to appropriate as our own. 
With this theoretical background in view, I should now like return to 
the CCU. The central question for international law reformers who like 
the botanical metaphor, therefore, is not simply one of transplantation.94 
It is also one of acculturation: when selecting legal institutions to trans-
plant, what ex ante compromises do we make, and what ex post adjust-
ments are we willing to tolerate? And why do we make these choices in 
the places that we do? Before we naively throw around metaphors that 
sound good when stripped of their complexity in the field from which 
they arise, we should consider whether those field-specific complexities 
may actually help us to better understand the law reform project to which 
we are applying the metaphor. The richer understanding of the transplan-
tation metaphor permits me to explore three hypotheses about secured 
transactions law reform in States with economies in transition. 
First, all transplants imply more than the insertion of a clean species 
into new soil. Unlike the grafting of material from plant onto plant, 
transplanting involves attentiveness to physiology and genetics. Follow-
ing the general themes of Geoffrey Samuels,95 one might conclude that 
the more the legal architecture of the transplant resembles the architec-
ture of cognate legal institutions, the greater the chances of survival and 
adaptation. However, even when commercial law reform is accompanied 
by ex ante reforms, for example, to bankruptcy law, debtor-creditor law, 
and sales law, the climate, the character of the ambient soil, and other 
features of the ecosystem will generate ex post adaptive strategies.96 As 
applied to Ukraine, in order to overcome strategic behavior by creditors 
and debtors, it was necessary to define the generic category of “charge” to 
                                                                                                             
 93. This inventory is derived from ROBERT LEO SMITH & THOMAS SMITH, ECOLOGY 
AND FIELD BIOLOGY (6th ed. 2001). 
 94. I adopt fully as a goal for law reform the critique of transplantation advanced by 
Nelken, supra note 69, and I pursue the general logic of that critique in developing the 
idea of acculturation. 
 95. Geoffrey Samuels, Can Gaius Really Be Compared to Darwin?, 49 INT’L & 
COMP. L.Q. 297 (2000) (differentiating legal and zoological structural taxonomies). 
 96. See generally Roderick A. Macdonald & Hoi Kong, Patchwork Law Reform: 
Your Idea Is Good in Practice, But It Won’t Work in Theory, 44 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 11 
(2006). 
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include all consensual and nonconsensual encumbrances on an owner’s 
rights. 
Second, there can never be a perfect transplant, regardless of how simi-
lar the political economies of two States may be. All transplants are ex-
ogenous. All require ecosystem analysis. The less the political and legal 
environment is stable, the less entrenched legal interests are likely to derail 
substantive reforms that threaten acquired intellectual capital.97 That is, the 
greater the specific character of the climate, the soil, and native flora, the 
harder it is to neutralize local difference. In this light, it is impressive how 
quickly the legal profession and business and financial establishments 
have adapted to the new law, and how quickly pressure has arisen to de-
velop detailed rules relating specifically to deposit accounts, intellectual 
property, letters of credit, and so on. 
Third, and conversely, all transplants have consequences for surround-
ing flora and fauna. No transplant is limited in its effects to the soil im-
mediately surrounding it. Some of these consequences are immediate; 
some make themselves felt through time. Much of the Western theory of 
secured lending is inapplicable to and unworkable in countries like 
Ukraine. Commentators who would make law subservient to market ra-
tionality tend to downplay the extent to which principles of domestic law—
from the constitution, to rules of judicature and civil procedure, to family 
law, to tax law—influence the shape and operation of commercial law re-
gimes. It is not possible to enact fine-grained legislation relating to security 
on movable property until there is broad consensus on and acceptance of 
the basic objectives and institutions of a modernized secured transactions 
regime. This said, it remains to be seen whether it will take Ukraine half a 
century and two major rewrites (as has been the case with Article 9) to 
achieve a secured transactions law that meets the strictures of critics. 
From the perspective of 2009, the Charge Law can also be seen as a 
remarkably successful enactment. There is evidence that, as a moder-
nized and rationalized regime of security on movable property, it has 
contributed to enhanced credit availability and commercial activity. As it 
is well adapted to the social, economic, political, and legal environment 
into which it has been projected, jurists suggest that the Charge Law has 
                                                                                                             
 97. While formally, the rejection of the CEAL draft in Ukraine and the rejection of 
the DCC in Quebec appear to be motivated by similar atavistic responses, the differences 
between the two processes were substantial. Most notably, even though expressed in the 
language of “preserving the purity of the civil law tradition,” the Quebec rejection was 
actually more the rejection by the profession’s conservative elements of the substance of 
the reform being proposed, than the rejection of the conceptual form in which it was pre-
sented. By contrast, the Ukraine rejection did not center upon the substance of the pro-
posed reform, but its mode of expression. 
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taken root and has generated calls for further reforms to facilitate the 
granting of security over intangibles and other commercial instruments. 
The drafters were able to reform the law with minimum conceptual dis-
ruption to the existing legal regime. As such, the endeavor in Ukraine 
offers a model of how the logic of modernization can be pursued in civil 
law jurisdictions transitioning from socialist economies to market-based 
economies. If there are still unresolved issues, they do not revolve 
around the failure to adopt fully the model of Article 9 functionalism. 
Rather, these issues illustrate how a vulgar concept of transplantation can 
color our evaluation of a law reform’s success of failure. Simply because 
the receiving ecosystem altered the ex ante physiology of the transplant, 
as reflected in the Charge Law, does not mean that, over time, these ex 
post adaptive strategies will not be successful in generating further 
reform. 
III. VIRAL PROPAGATION: THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF NORMATIVE 
PANDEMICS 
I take my third example from the recent work of UNCITRAL’s Work-
ing Group VI: Secured Transactions. This example is meant to illustrate 
the usefulness of a newer metaphor for the migration of international 
commercial law norms—viral propagation. 
Once more, I begin by asking what exactly the metaphor of viral prop-
agation implies. The relative novelty of the metaphor in international 
commercial law reform means both that it is not as well developed as 
other metaphors, and that strong counter-currents have not yet emerged.98 
For most jurists the viral metaphor connotes an unplanned and uncon-
certed mechanism by which norms self-perpetuate and self-propagate. In 
this version of norm migration, the memetic idea is directly applied to 
law and is subject to the same critiques as memetics.99 Other jurists dep-
loy the viral metaphor more as a rhetorical device than as a conceptual 
tool. Here, the assumption is that there are mappable affinities between 
                                                                                                             
 98. The viral propagation metaphor is occasionally deployed in other human fields, 
such as memetics and marketing. See, e.g., RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 203–
15 (1976); Jeffrey Rayport, The Virus of Marketing, FAST COMPANY, Dec. 1996, at 68, 
available at http://www.fastcompany.com/magazine/06/virus.html. The first usage is rhe-
torical, while the second use claims prescriptive bite and has, therefore, been subject to 
critique. See Mark Jeffreys, The Meme Metaphor, 43 PERSP. BIOLOGY & MED. 227 
(2000). 
 99. While the legal literature is small, it is powerful. See, e.g., Michael S. Fried, The 
Evolution of Legal Concepts: The Memetic Perspective, 39 JURIMETRICS 291, 302–16 
(1999); Jeffrey Evans Starke, Pushing Evolutionary Analysis of Law or Evolving Law: 
Design Without a Designer, 53 FLA. L. REV. 875 (2001). 
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the transmission of viruses to human organisms and the transmission of 
ideas to legal systems.100 Both hypotheses, however, presuppose that no 
matter how viral (that is, unplanned and self-perpetuating) international 
law reform may be, the relevant sites of normative transmission will al-
ways be the official law of States.101 
A. The UNCITRAL Legislative Guide 
To test the utility of the viral propagation metaphor I begin with the ef-
forts of UNCITRAL’s Working Group VI to produce a Legislative Guide 
on Secured Transactions (“Legislative Guide” or “Guide”), which is 
aimed at States seeking to modernize their secured transactions laws.102 
From the outset, the rationale for the project was stated in relatively un-
compromising terms. Secured credit is a good thing, and therefore States 
should establish legal regimes to facilitate the growth of secured credit in 
their economies.103 Initially, there was an (unstated) assumption that only 
certain countries would benefit from attending to the recommendations 
                                                                                                             
 100. See, e.g., Richard Michael Fischl, The Epidemiology of Critique, 57 U. MIAMI L. 
REV. 475 (2003) (discussing the critical legal studies outbreak); Gil Grantmore, The 
Phages of American Law, 36 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 455 (2002) (using the biological analogy 
to describe terrorism and the American security and law enforcement response). 
 101. Even Waller, supra note 3, makes this assumption; compare it, however, with the 
work of Makela, supra note 1, who imagines deploying the metaphor to explore norm 
migration in a legal pluralist perspective. On the legal pluralist point, see also Macdonald, 
Illuminating Legal Change, supra note 91, at 1116, 1119–21 (exploring “several dimen-
sions of law making in a global world” through the metaphor of light and color). 
 102. Between 1968 and 1980, UNCITRAL considered various projects to study securi-
ty interests, propose core principles, and develop uniform rules for secured transactions, 
but all were abandoned because of a failure to achieve consensus as to their scope, utility, 
or feasibility. See UNCITRAL, Earlier Projects Relating to Security Interests, http://www. 
uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/security_past.html (last visited Apr. 20, 2009). After 
Working Group VI completed its work on the Convention on the Assignment of Recei-
vables in International Trade, G.A. Res. 56/81, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/81 (Jan. 31, 2002), 
it was charged by the Commission to begin work on preparing a Legislative Guide to 
Secured Transactions. This Guide was meant to complement the work of other interna-
tional organizations—e.g., the IMF, World Bank, EBRD, ADB, OAS, L’Organisation 
pour l’Harmonisation en Afrique du Droit des Affaires (“OHADA”), and UNIDROIT—
many of which had already produced documents entitled “core principles of secured trans-
actions,” model laws, or international conventions, such as the UNIDROIT Convention 
on International Interests in Mobile Equipment (Nov. 16, 2001), available at http://www. 
unidroit.org/english/conventions/mobile-equipment/mobile-equipment.pdf. 
 103. The literature, particularly the law and economics literature, is extensive. See, 
e.g., Ross Levine, Financial Development and Economic Growth: Views and Agenda, 35 
J. ECON. LIT. 688 (1997); Anthony Saunders et al., The Economic Implications of Interna-
tional Secured Transactions Law Reform: A Case Study, 20 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 309 
(2000). 
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of the Legislative Guide, although a broader framing of the project’s util-
ity emerged as the deliberations of the Working Group proceeded. In-
deed, the final document provided in its first paragraph: “[t]he Guide is 
intended to be useful to States that do not currently have efficient and 
effective secured transactions laws, as well as to States that already have 
workable laws but wish to modernize these laws and harmonize them 
with the laws of other States.”104 
While delegates from most States broadly agreed with the proposition 
that inadequate access to business credit often impeded entrepreneurial 
activity, some were less convinced that secured credit as such was the 
primary palliative for this inadequacy. On the whole, concern was not 
expressed in the skeptical “not net efficiency” language of U.S. law and 
economics scholars,105 but rather as uncertainty that secured commercial 
financing credit was a greater social good than employment insurance, 
health care, worker’s compensation, pensions, and supplier-based trade 
credit.106 More significantly, delegates from many States bristled at the 
paternalistic suggestion (often originating in delegations from States with 
so-called developed economies) that the point of the exercise was to al-
low States with economies “in course of development” to benefit from 
the experience, insight, and expertise on offer.107 Other delegates (nota-
                                                                                                             
 104.  UNCITRAL, LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON SECURED TRANSACTIONS (2007) (final text 
submitted for publication), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/security- 
lg/e/final-final-e.pdf [hereinafter FINAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE]. By the end of the delibera-
tions of the Working Group, four main targets of legislative reform were identified: (a) 
developed economies with what were deemed to be relatively efficient, effective, and 
functioning regimes (e.g., Canada, New Zealand, the United States); (b) developed 
economies with what were deemed to be inefficient secured transactions regimes (e.g., 
Australia, France, Germany, the United Kingdom); (c) economies in the course of devel-
opment with secured credit-unfriendly regimes (e.g., many Latin American States; many 
States in central Europe); (d) economies that are of all three above types but not based on 
“market principles” (e.g., many Islamic republics). 
 
 105. Since Alan Schwarz first raised the question whether secured transactions law 
was efficient, the debate has attracted continued scholarly interest. For one light-hearted 
contribution, see Richard L. Barnes, The Efficiency Justification for Secured Transac-
tions: Foxes with Soxes and Other Fanciful Stuff, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 13 (1993). See also 
David Carlson, Secured Credit as a Zero Sum Game, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1635 (1998). 
 106. For a discussion of the hedonistic logic of secured transactions in the frame of 
Aristotelian distributive justice, see Macdonald, Counter-Reformation, supra note 46. But 
cf. Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy and the Entitlements of Government: Whose Money Is It 
Anyway?, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 993 (1995). 
 107. The Final Legislative Guide addresses this concern by introductorily stating that it 
is designed to assist States at various stages of development. FINAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, 
supra note 104, ¶ 1. Looking ahead towards implementation, however, Vijay Tata, Chief 
Counsel at the World Bank, has cautioned that the Guide should not be used prescriptive-
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bly those from civil law States with functioning, although not recently 
reformed, secured transactions regimes) also felt that the logic driving 
the project was insensitive to models of secured financing other than Ar-
ticle 9. In addition, some European States with modernized non-Article 9 
regimes saw the project as an attempt to drive a wedge between them and 
their traditional “client States” in matters of law and trade. Finally, as the 
project drew near to completion, other European States perceived a threat 
to their predominance in financial markets and sought to modify the Leg-
islative Guide to protect existing distributions of economic power. 
Throughout the Working Group process, these tensions and cleavages 
were never far from the surface.108 
Despite these reservations, however, various macro-facts and macro-
norms of international trade led delegates to Working Group VI to con-
clude that modernizing secured transactions regimes to produce efficient, 
effective, accessible, low-cost commercial credit was a worthwhile en-
deavor.109 First, States that are resource rich are frequently cash poor; 
States that are cash rich are somewhat less frequently resource poor (or 
have more available cash than they do borrowers seeking credit for entre-
preneurial purposes). Hence, legal regimes should facilitate economic co-
operation among States under conditions of political equality. Second, the 
production of tradable goods often takes place in States with low labor 
costs, where local manufacturers do not own the intellectual property re-
flected in the products they produce. Hence, legal regimes should facilitate 
the cooperative engagement of production across trade boundaries even 
when the assets produced are themselves not destined for export. Third, 
much of international sales law involves the delivery of already charged 
assets into States lacking developed regimes of nonpossessory security 
over movable property. Hence, legal regimes should display sufficient 
                                                                                                             
ly as a proxy for a participatory, deliberative legislative process within States. Rather, 
“[t]he very complex debates about policies and the costs and benefits of various legisla-
tive designs that took place in Vienna and [New York] in the preparation of the Guide, 
will and should be replayed in greater detail and with greater specificity in the reforming 
countries.” Vijay Tata, The Role of Multilaterals in the Promotion of Modern Securities 
Law, Remarks at the Congress to Celebrate the Fortieth Annual Session of UNCITRAL 
(July 10, 2007), available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/congress/Tata-revised.pdf. 
 108. This is, obviously, my own interpretation of interventions made at Working 
Group sessions reported in the sessions and related documents. For a complete account-
ing of the activities of Working Group VI on the Legislative Guide project, see 2002 to 
Present: Security Interests, supra note 16.  
 109. The current empirical literature appears to suggest that the effect of security is not 
primarily that it serves to reduce the cost of credit. Rather, the absence of effective secu-
rity rights simply means that credit is unavailable. See SECURED TRANSACTIONS REFORM 
AND ACCESS TO CREDIT (Frédérique Dahan & John Simpson eds., 2008) 
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comity so that the cross-border delivery of assets does not comprise the 
security of an export creditor’s rights. And finally, the international market 
for trade in securities and other incorporeal rights is often distinct from the 
international market for manufactured property. Hence, legal regimes need 
to facilitate the aggregation and disaggregation of securities and recei-
vables so that they may be financed separately from the production at their 
origin. 
These facts on the ground and the normative consequences they imply, 
along with my experience at UNCITRAL, convince me of the founda-
tional principle that should drive the modernization of secured transac-
tions law: internationalization is a two-way street. From this principle 
two corollaries may immediately be derived. First, a number of so-called 
advanced economies with so-called modernized secured transactions re-
gimes (for example, the United States and Canada) will have to further 
reform their secured transactions laws (especially in connection with 
cross-border insolvencies) in order to be successful in the international 
sphere. The second corollary is that sellers and lenders from so-called 
developed economies need purchasers and borrowers from so-called de-
veloping economies just as much as these purchasers and borrowers need 
them. In brief, notwithstanding the rhetoric that “secured credit transac-
tions” are a good thing because developing countries need capital in-
flows, it is equally the case that cash-rich developed economies need safe 
harbors for their capital outflow.110 
When the Legislative Guide was first mooted in the late fall of 2001, 
there was a consensus among the group of experts convened by 
UNCITRAL that the Guide should begin with a restatement of the core 
principles of an efficient and effective secured transactions law. At that 
time, two members of the group were charged with drafting a brief pres-
entation of these core principles. One argued for a set of key objectives 
and core principles that more or less tracked those already identified by 
other international organizations and that focused uniquely on the pro-
                                                                                                             
 110. The point has not often been raised in connection with what is euphemistically 
characterized as the subprime crisis, although business debtors from developing countries 
are now paying the price for the profligacy of institutional lenders. On the one hand, the 
very existence of subprime mortgage loans is a classical example of the consequences of 
too much credit chasing too few good risks. On the other hand, the reckless repackaging 
of high-risk domestic receivables supposedly backed by appreciating assets has drawn 
investment away from entrepreneurs in States with under-developed secured transactions 
laws that, in fact, are less likely to default than domestic borrowers formally issuing ap-
parently secured debt. 
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motion of secured credit.111 The other proposed a more comprehensive 
set of principles meant to contextualize secured transactions within the 
general law relating to the compulsory performance of obligations.112 
Although the issues presented by both perspectives remained throughout 
the process of drafting the Guide, the group of experts quickly decided to 
recommend to the Working Group that it adopt a series of core principles 
based on existing documents in international circulation, and Working 
Group VI accepted this recommendation at the outset of its deliberations. 
What, then, were the basic features of the UNCITRAL approach, and 
how were they actually put into practice? First the project was to develop 
a legislative guide, not a model law or a convention. In fact, however, 
Working Group VI hoped that its Guide might achieve uptake, and so its 
recommendations were quite detailed and cast precisely in the form of 
text that could be pasted without much difficulty into a draft law. 
Second, Working Group VI aimed to produce a legislative guide that 
would assist States with a broad range of economies, social practices, 
and political priorities. In fact, however, many of the Guide’s proposals 
assumed a market economy with a number of correlative financial and 
judicial institutions typical of a North American economy. Third, the 
stated ambition of Working Group VI was to set out “best practices” for 
secured financing, wherever these were to be found.113 In fact, however, 
the Guide by and large adopted the basic principles of modernization 
                                                                                                             
 111. For examples of the core principles identified by other international organiza-
tions, see ASIAN DEV. BANK, 2 LAW AND POLICY REFORM AT THE ASIAN DEVELOPMENT 
BANK 2000 (2000), available at http://www.adb.org/Documents/Others/Law_ADB/lpr_ 
2000_2.asp?p=lawdevt#contents (comprising a major study on secured transactions law 
reform in India, Indonesia, Pakistan, the People’s Republic of China, and Thailand); 
Frédérique Dahan & John Simpson, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Devel-
opment’s Secured Transactions Project: A Model Law and Ten Core Principles for a 
Modern Secured Transactions Law in Countries of Central and Eastern Europe (and 
Elsewhere!), in SECURITY RIGHTS IN MOVABLE PROPERTY IN EUROPEAN PRIVATE LAW, 
supra note 7, at 98–116; Pascale DeBoeck & Thomas Laryea, Development of Standards 
for Security Interests and Enforcement of Claims (2003), http://www.imf.org/external/np/ 
leg/sem/2002/cdmfl/eng/pdb.pdf; WORLD BANK, PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE INSOLVENCY 
AND CREDITOR RIGHTS SYSTEMS (REVISED DRAFT) (2005), available at http://siteresources. 
worldbank.org/GILD/Resources/FINAL-ICRPrinciples-March2009.pdf.  
 112. For a brief outline of this larger context, see supra text accompanying notes 25–32. 
 113. U.N. Conf. on Int’l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], Working Group VI on Sec. Interests, 
Draft Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.VI/WP.2/ 
Add.1 (Feb. 12, 2002) [hereinafter Draft Legislative Guide] (“The focus of the Guide is 
on developing laws that achieve practical economic benefits for States that adopt them. 
The Guide seeks to rise above the differences among legal regimes to suggest pragmatic 
and proven solutions that can be accepted and implemented in States having divergent 
legal traditions.”). 
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instantiated by Article 9: (a) a unitary, functional approach to scope; (b) 
nonpossessory security over present and future property; (c) an extended 
concept of proceeds; (d) a notice-filing registry system; (e) non-judicial 
enforcement; (f) equal protection for acquisition financing whether of-
fered by sellers or lenders; and (g) special rules governing third-party 
effectiveness, priority, and enforcement of certain intangible assets, in-
cluding receivables, bank accounts, independent guarantees, negotiable 
instruments, and negotiable documents.114 
In view of these divergences between the ambitions of the Working 
Group and the manner in which these ambitions were actually translated 
into recommendations, it is worth reflecting on whether the initial state-
ment of the Guide’s core principles may have truncated discussion of 
alternatives to Article 9. Recall that the overall objective of secured trans-
actions regimes was said to be promoting availability of low-cost credit in 
order to facilitate the successful operation and expansion of domestic busi-
nesses and improve their ability to compete domestically and in the global 
marketplace. Compare the “[k]ey objectives of an effective and efficient 
secured transactions law” as set out in Recommendation 1, taking note of 
the manner in which the title is phrased, with the draft proposal that the 
group of experts did not recommend to Working Group VI.115 The key 
objectives expressed in the Legislative Guide focus on the design of an 
“efficient and effective” secured transactions law: 
(a) To promote low-cost credit by enhancing the availability of secured 
credit[;] 
. . . . 
(b) To allow debtors to use the full value inherent in their assets to sup-
port credit[;] 
. . . . 
(c) To enable parties to obtain security rights in a simple and efficient 
manner[;] 
. . . . 
(d) To provide for equal treatment of diverse sources of credit and of 
diverse forms of secured transactions[;] 
. . . . 
                                                                                                             
 114. See FINAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 104, at Recommendations 8–9; Rec-
ommendation 13; Recommendation 19; Recommendations 32–33; Recommendation 142; 
Recommendations 178, 187–88; Recommendations 23–28, 48–53, 101–09, 114–16, 117–
30, 167–77, respectively. 
 115. See supra text accompanying note 17. 
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(e) To validate non-possessory security rights in all types of asset[;] 
. . . . 
(f) To enhance certainty and transparency by providing for registration 
of a notice in a general security rights registry[;] 
. . . . 
(g) To establish clear and predictable priority rules[;] 
. . . . 
(h) To facilitate efficient enforcement of creditors’ rights[;] 
. . . . 
(i) To allow parties maximum flexibility to negotiate the terms of their 
security agreement[;] 
. . . . 
(j) To balance the interests of all affected persons[; and] 
. . . . 
(k) To harmonize secured transactions laws, including conflict-of-laws 
rules[.]116 
With the sole exception of principle (j), all of these objectives are inter-
nal to the logic of a secured transactions regime itself and aim at achiev-
ing transactional efficiency. 
Consider how these key objectives and core principles might have been 
alternatively formulated had the ambition been to provide States with 
guidance on not only the secured transactions regime, but also how it 
should be successfully implemented. The following were presented to the 
group of experts in the fall of 2001, under the title “Core Principles of 
Modern Regimes of Security Rights,” a title that did not explicitly refer 
to economic efficiency as an overriding value.117 The principles aimed at 
several objectives: 
(1) To balance efficiency and justice, the regime should aim at making 
credit available at the lowest possible cost, in a manner that respects the 
fundamental political and social goals of the society in question. 
(2) To achieve coherence with public policy, the regime must reflect a 
fair balance between legitimate public policy goals being pursued by 
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the reform of the secured transactions law in Ukraine. See MACDONALD, LAW OF UKRAINE, 
supra note 79, at 17–24. 
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States as reflected in their regulation of basic concepts of status, proper-
ty, and obligations and the opportunistic goals of individual creditors 
and debtors as reflected in the idea of freedom of contract. 
(3) To achieve a comprehensive regulatory framework, the regime of se-
curity should be comprehensive as to all the elements of the security 
nexus—debtors, creditors, obligations, collateral—in order to (a) minim-
ize regulatory uncertainties or unfair inequality of access to the regime; 
(b) avoid creating inadvertent gaps; (c) ensure the best integration poss-
ible of competing regulatory regimes; and (d) promote competition on 
the cost of credit among purveyors of credit to businesses. 
(4)  To reflect a functional design, a regime capable of granting securi-
ty, eligible collateral, pre-default rights and obligations, and secured 
creditors’ recourses, and upholding a general theory of publicity of se-
cured rights should apply, regardless of the origin or form of the security 
right in order to prevent debtors and creditors from artificially manipu-
lating their status, the character of their obligation, or the legal nature 
of their assets so as to either escape or fall under the regulatory regime. 
(5)  To promote party autonomy, the logic of the regime should be as 
simple as possible, with the legislature deciding questions having to do 
with definition and distribution of entitlements in the regime from an 
“ideal-type” perspective that maximizes the efficiency potentialities of 
a consensual regime of secured transactions. 
(6) To provide for intelligible rules, since the point of the regime is to 
permit debtors and creditors to plan their affairs in reasonable legal se-
curity, (a) the regime’s rules should be drafted in a manner that is intel-
ligible to non-lawyers; (b) imperative rules should limit or prohibit 
choices only for reasons of unfairness or perverse distribution of bur-
dens upon the parties to the transaction or third parties; (c) the regime 
should avoid making superficial distinctions of form where there are 
essential identities of substance; (d) the regime should not mandate an 
implied intent either by creditors or debtors, and legal fictions should be 
purged; (e) the regime should not presume outcomes (e.g., a commer-
cially reasonable price upon realization) that can actually by deter-
mined by the operation of market principles. 
(7) To achieve internal coherence, the rights created should reflect the 
legitimate interests and expectations of debtors, creditors, and third per-
sons, given the underlying logic of a regime of security on property, by 
(a) structuring incentives to encourage performance by debtors; (b) 
structuring incentives to encourage responsible behavior by creditors; 
(c) designing the regime to discourage illegitimate third-party interfe-
rence. 
(8) To maximize realization value, the regime should structure incen-
tives so that the value of the collateral is maintained prior to default, 
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and should be designed to avoid inefficient formalism in post-default 
enforcement by providing debtors, creditors, and third parties with in-
centives to maximize realization value.118  
Of all the policy differences that were manifest throughout the delibe-
rations of Working Group VI, two were present from the outset and 
preoccupied the Working Group up until its very final sessions. The first 
was the question of title security, including most pointedly the seller’s 
retention-of-title transaction; the second, closely allied to this, was whether 
the Guide should recommend a comprehensive filing regime in order to 
obtain third-party effectiveness of nonpossessory rights.119 Initially, del-
egates from many States expressed resistance to the functional approach 
of Article 9. As in the reform process in Quebec and Ukraine, they felt 
that title security was of a different genus than true security.120 Over the 
course of its deliberations, however, the Working Group reached a con-
sensus that the primary difficulty lay not with title security in general, 
but with the retention-of-title transaction specifically. The delegations 
came to accept that lender transactions, such as sales with a right of re-
demption, fiduciary transfers of title, retroactive giving-in-payment 
clauses, and foreclosure agreements, were in fact secured transactions 
and could properly be included within the Guide’s general functional 
definition.121 
Nonetheless, the process almost broke down over how to deal with re-
tention-of-title transactions. In the end, the Working Group decided that 
it would adopt a dual approach. To begin, the overall frame of the Guide 
would be cast in the language of a functional approach; then, in so far as 
a particular type of security right was concerned, acquisition financing, 
two approaches were permitted: a unitary approach that tracked the Ar-
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 119. In the chronological order of the Working Group sessions, the issue of registra-
tion actually came up for resolution first (in what is now Chapter IV), since consideration 
of retention-of-title transactions was deferred to acquisition financing (what is now Chap-
ter IX). But the concern about registration was essentially about the necessity for registra-
tion of retention-of-title devices rather than an opposition to the concept of notice filing 
per se. 
 120. This concern was expressed primarily by many civil law States in Africa, Europe, 
and Latin America, although it also found resonance with delegations from States having 
other legal traditions, but not those from common law States (with the exception of the 
United Kingdom). 
 121. The deliberations of the Working Group are nicely tracked in the Commentary 
section of the FINAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE, supra note 104. On title transactions generally, 
see id. ch. I, ¶¶ 45–112 (on “Scope of application, basic approaches to security and gen-
eral themes common to all chapters of the Guide”), and for retention-of-title particularly, 
see id. ch. IX, ¶¶ 13–84 (on “Acquisition financing”). 
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ticle 9 model, and a non-unitary approach that preserved not only the 
Article 9 model, but also separate retention-of-title type transactions (a 
seller’s reservation of ownership and financial leases) as long as they 
produced functionally equivalent results.122 Interestingly, this dual ap-
proach—assimilating lender title transactions to security rights and pre-
serving retention-of-title transactions as a separate category—is also 
adopted by the just released Draft European Civil Code, Book IX on 
“Proprietary Security in Movable Assets.”123 
While some delegations regret the compromise over acquisition financ-
ing, all in all it must be said that the Legislative Guide is a significant 
achievement, judged both on its intellectual merit and as the output of a 
lengthy process of negotiation. This process, moreover, has much to 
teach about how the metaphor of viral propagation can assist in manag-
ing consensual, international commercial law reform such as that under-
taken by UNCITRAL. 
B. The Logic of Viral Transmission 
Let me develop this point by exploring the nuances of the third metaphor 
deployed by international commercial law reformers, viral propaga-
tion.124 The metaphor of virus provides a rich point of entry for examin-
ing how Article 9 thinking has become a pandemic in international 
commercial law reform. However, in order to derive the full benefit of 
the virus metaphor, it is important first to attend carefully to the subtle-
ties of epidemiology. How do viruses actually propagate themselves? 
One of the reasons why viruses have become such a powerful meta-
phor is their association with the technology of knowledge transmission 
through computer programs. Biological viruses are also found every-
where, constantly attaching themselves to host cells via their protein. At 
this point, the virus is able to exploit the nucleus of the host cell to assist 
its reproduction, which then migrates outwards to another host. Of 
course, to propagate themselves viruses need to be transmitted. Hence 
the importance of studying “vectors of transmission.” Some viruses are 
relatively benign, but very easily transmitted—the common cold, for ex-
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 123. See ULRICH DROBNIG, STUDY GROUP ON A EUR. CIVIL CODE, PROPRIETARY 
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 124. I use the viral metaphor purely descriptively and not normatively. In this usage, I 
follow Waller, supra note 3. Much of the account of the next four paragraphs relies upon 
this unpublished article and from Makela, supra note 1. 
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ample. Others are particularly vicious, but relatively difficult to trans-
mit—the HIV virus, for example. But whether a virus becomes a pan-
demic also depends on the nature of the host population to which it is 
spread. If the host is relatively immune to such infections, even a malig-
nant virus propagated by multiple effective vectors of transmission may 
not result in infection. The host’s resistance to a virus may be founded on 
its own inherent biological properties or may be enhanced by inoculation 
with an effective vaccine.125 As Guido Calabresi reportedly said in ex-
plaining why CLS had not infected Yale Law School, “[People] with 
Cow Pox do not contract Small Pox.”126 By contrast, if the immune sys-
tem is weak, a virus may kill the host before it has the chance to repro-
duce itself and infect others. 
A further structural factor influencing the spread of a virus is the con-
text within which the host lives. So for example, the influence of the 
relative density of susceptible hosts is inversely proportionate to the 
strength of the transmission vectors. Isolated hosts are less susceptible to 
viral transmission than densely arranged hosts. Here is a final reflection. 
Because viruses are so active, they can often mutate, and host immune 
systems that have successfully resisted one viral strand can often fall 
prey to a new mutated strand. Alternatively, viruses may remain dormant 
for years following infection, before ultimately manifesting themselves 
in a variant form. 
This brief canvass of viral epidemiology hardly scratches the surface of 
what might be learned from the metaphor and how the metaphor may be 
used to generate a model of norm migration. It does, nonetheless, suggest 
some variables that will affect international norm entrepreneurs’ propa-
gation of particular legal ideologies, such as Article 9. 
First of all, a legal ideology will be most effectively propagated when 
it infects a field of law organized around a few broadly accepted assump-
tions. The barrage of essentially identical “key objectives” and “core 
principles” promulgated by well-endowed entrepreneurs since the mid-
1980s can been seen as an essential precondition to UNCITRAL’s deci-
sion to ask Working Group VI to take on the Legislative Guide project 
twenty years after the last of several failed attempts to move onto this 
terrain. 
Second, a legal concept or regime is most likely to infect a decision-
making body where authority (in particular, law-making authority) is 
highly centralized, hierarchically organized, and legislatively rather than 
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 126. Fischl, supra note 100, at 478. 
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judicially driven. This is the case, for example, with Ukraine, but not 
Quebec, where competing legal professions prevent the State from im-
posing a singular law reform agenda and where, notwithstanding codifi-
cation, courts play a role akin to that played by courts in common law 
jurisdictions. 
Third, propagation will be most successful where there are multiple re-
combinant interests—vectors of transmission—to sustain contact in di-
verse settings: uniform law organizations; model laws; international 
agencies (e.g., UNIDROIT and UNCITRAL); international financial or-
ganizations with tied grants (e.g., the World Bank and IMF); treaties and 
conventions; regional trading blocs; vestiges of colonialism; scholarly 
round tables on best practices involving law professors, graduate stu-
dents, and private economic actors; and the conscription of powerful in-
terest groups. 
Fourth, countries that are relatively isolated, geographically or intellec-
tually, are less susceptible to viral transmission than densely arranged 
countries with relatively open intellectual frontiers. On the one hand, one 
may cite Albania, Myanmar, and Zimbabwe as States relatively unlikely 
to spread a law reform virus; on the other hand, one may cite most post-
communist States of Central Europe, and States that belong to the 
OHADA, Mercado Común Sudamericano, and Association of Southeast 
Asian Nations as likely targets for explosive transmission once one State 
becomes infected. 
Fifth, propagation is diminished where hosts have been ideologically 
inoculated against the virus, usually by precommitments said to be 
grounded in socio-cultural factors. These factors may be defensive (a 
strong host), or offensive (an inoculation by a modest form of the virus 
that successfully propagates itself in resistance to more virulent forms). 
Examples of the former would include the reaction of Germany to the 
acquisition financing regime of Article 9, and the latter would include the 
reaction of the United Kingdom to any proposal that threatens to dimi-
nish the role of the City in international finance, especially the financing 
of receivables. 
How then might we understand the viral metaphor in relation to the 
UNCITRAL project? It is important to identify the ideological points of 
resistance among Member States. One was the reaction to an extended 
concept of proceeds combined with security on future assets and univer-
salities, which led to a perceived overprotection of a first secured credi-
tor’s rights. Another was the attempt to restrain policy choices by States 
that had nonmarket-driven social welfare programs and that did not ex-
ternalize the cost of excessive credit onto the bankruptcy market. A third 
was the suspicion of special rules designed to favor the purveyors of fi-
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nancial proxies for asset-backed lending, bank accounts, receivables, ne-
gotiable documents, and so on. And a fourth, where compromise was 
ultimately reached, involved recognizing the special character of reten-
tion of a vendor’s ownership rights in relation to a financing lender’s 
rights. Given these points of resistance and the States that were more 
vocal in articulating them, the viral metaphor suggests that the propaga-
tion of Article 9 ideology through the Legislative Guide may be less 
pandemic than desired. The viral metaphor also suggests that, had there 
been greater sensitivity to implementation in the articulation of key ob-
jectives (the legal, social, political, and economic contexts of law reform) 
and the necessary steps to ensure propagation (attentiveness to those es-
pecially vocal and organized in their interests), the chances of wide-
spread infection would have increased. Finally, the viral metaphor points 
to a paradox in the processes of international agencies like UNCITRAL. 
Viral propagation presumes, at least initially, a one way migration: the 
infection of Working Group VI by the Article 9 virus. But viruses can 
also mutate. To the extent that a mutant virus may emerge in the new 
host, the initial host may be re-infected by the mutant strain. The condi-
tions under which North American common law States are susceptible to 
re-infection will depend on the same considerations of viral propagation 
that initiated the original pandemic. 
From the perspective of early 2009, and despite the cautionary remarks 
of the previous paragraph, the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide looks like 
it could be a relatively successful endeavor of international norm migra-
tion. I have argued above that the context of commercial law reform en-
compasses a broad range of factors besides the general structure of the 
domestic legal regime. For this reason, it is important to be clear about 
the economic, social, and political conditions presupposed by existing 
secured lending regimes, so that the policy goals sought to be achieved 
through modernization can be realized in practice. We must be modest in 
our claims, because we have only an incomplete understanding of which 
modernized secured transactions regimes are successful, and somewhat 
more troubling, because it is not at all clear that we possess the criteria 
that will enable us to judge whether a particular law reform project has 
succeeded or failed. In acknowledging the depth of our ignorance on 
these issues, we can appreciate why, ultimately, our choice of metaphors 
matters: metaphors (like core principles) frame analysis, exposing and 
occluding political choices, and defining possibilities for action as well 
as the sites where action is most likely to be effective.127 
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CONCLUSION: VIRTUE ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW REFORM 
My experiences with reforming secured transactions regimes in Que-
bec and Ukraine provided an important background for my later partici-
pation in UNCITRAL’s Working Group VI: Secured Transactions. As 
the UNCITRAL project evolved over the past seven years, it seemed to 
me that Member States have learned an important foundational lesson. To 
the surprise of many who have hitched their wagon (intellectually, and 
more importantly, emotionally) to Article 9, there are no conceptual fea-
tures of the civil law tradition preventing the enactment of a functionally-
integrated secured transactions regime that achieves the same goals as 
Article 9 and does so in an equally efficient manner.128 Further, there are 
no conceptual features of the Islamic law tradition or of any other legal 
tradition (including diverse chthonic legal traditions)129 preventing the 
realization of a functionally-integrated secured transactions regime that 
achieves the same goals as Article 9 and does so in an equally efficient 
manner. 
Of course, for many the learning curve has been steep. On the one 
hand, some from advanced commercial economies tend to be patronizing 
of States with advanced commercial economies that do not agree on the 
“perfection” of Article 9. Their learning curve is moral. Whatever U.S. 
jurists may think of American exceptionalism and the mission of the 
United States to bring about a commercial pax Americana, it is far from 
clear that this ambition is shared around the world. On the other hand, 
some from other States tend to be quite defensive about existing legal 
regimes and unwilling to question the legal “way it is,” which they 
learned several decades earlier as law students. Their learning curve is 
also moral. 
More generally, in accounts of modernization, it is now time to give up 
claims to universalism in favor of more differentiated analyses and pre-
scriptions for particular times and particular places. We need to locate 
our evaluations of commercial law reform within a better understanding 
of how local entrepreneurial networks and credit institutions function on 
the ground. The history of successive revisions to Article 9 illustrates the 
point. Its initial design was meant to respond to a particular set of prob-
lems faced by common law jurisdictions in the middle decades of the 
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twentieth century, and the revisions since then have continued to be res-
ponsive to locally specific problems.130 
These observations about Article 9 are not meant to sound a note of 
pessimism about the possibilities of international norm migration. Ra-
ther, they invite discussion about a larger ontological point. Much of our 
current thinking about generating international legal norms, especially as 
reflected in the metaphors of harmonization, transplantation, and viruses, 
follows from the manner in which Western legal culture conceives law. 
Central to both common law and civil law traditions is the belief that law 
is fundamentally propositional: law as rules and justice as following rules. 
Hence the commitment to law reform as a matter of simply, one, “enacting 
a regime of rules,” and, two, “getting the rules right.” My happy expe-
rience as President of the Law Commission of Canada and my equivocal 
experiences in other law reform settings suggest otherwise.131 Reforming 
law by changing rules will never solve legal problems. The best one can 
hope for by changing the rules is to substitute a better class of questions for 
the suboptimal questions that might currently shape legal reflection.132 
The attempts to modernize the law of secured transactions illustrate 
this larger point. The initial ambition of Article 9 was to achieve, as far 
as possible, a unitary and comprehensive regulation of consensual devices 
deployed to secure the performance of an obligation. As Grant Gilmore 
observed, the primary targets of the reform were inventory financing 
(where manifold title-based institutions were utilized) and receivables 
financing (where the law was still largely stuck in judge-made rules de-
veloped in the mid-nineteenth century).133 The mechanism was the “sub-
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stance of the transaction principle.”134 Today, however, given the in-
creasing specialization of rules relating to different types of collateral, it 
is far from certain that the idea of a general regime of security interests 
still exists under Article 9.3. In addition, the regime in Quebec reveals 
that it is possible to enact multiple functional regimes, distinguishing not 
only between true security and title security, but also among subsets of 
title security. And again, as the Charge Law of Ukraine reveals, it is 
possible to enact a dual functionality, regrouping all true security under 
one functional system and all title security under a single, complementa-
ry functional system. Finally, as the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide and 
the Draft Common Frame of Reference (“DCFR”) reveal, it is possible to 
enact a regime that sweeps all true security and all title security into a 
single functional regime, with the exception of reservation-of-title trans-
actions like financial leases and retention-of-title sales. Nothing about the 
idea of functionalism dictates which of these regulatory strategies is op-
timal. It is worth noting, however, the enactment dates in chronological 
order: Article 9.1, 1962; the Civil Code of Québec, 1994; Article 9.3, 
2000; the Ukraine Charge Law, 2004; and both the UNCITRAL Legisla-
tive Guide and Book IX (Proprietary Security in Movable Assets) of the 
DCFR, 2008. To what extent do these differences reflect particularity—
not only in space, but also in time? Perhaps now is the moment to aban-
don the quest for transcendent (good-for-all-places-and-all-times) law 
reform. 
If this is the case, the central question then becomes the following: 
how does one achieve a better class of questions in law reform projects? 
In my view this is not a matter of propositional ethics, whether Kantian 
or utilitarian. It is a matter of what Aristotle called phronesis. Phronesis 
means “moral sensitivity, perception, imagination and judgment in-
formed by experience.”135 For Aristotle the capacity to be sensitive to the 
particularities of a given situation is a necessary condition for moral 
agency. Even if universal moral principles were to exist, they would not 
be self-applying. The moral agent displaying phronesis is never relieved 
of the responsibility for making decisions. As moral agents we must 
therefore constantly reassess what it is we think we know. This, in turn, 
means cultivating openness to and reciprocity with others. One site of 
inter-subjective communication is allegory. The strength of allegory is 
that it captures the minutiae of moral life, permitting context to be con-
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veyed, often with explicit metaphor referents.136 It is, in this sense, a ve-
hicle for phronesis, a form of expression that does not allow for a final, 
propositionalized message that is separable from the story itself, easily 
transmissible, formulaic, and universalized. 
As law reformers (moral agents), how do we translate this sense of 
phronesis into actions and justifications for action in an inter-dependent 
world? In all my commercial law reform experiences over the past dec-
ades, Working Groups have conducted their affairs under “ideal-type”  
assumptions that States, businesses, and people are rational, “wealth-
maximizing,” economic actors. Of course, such assumptions are methodo-
logical hypotheses and should not be taken as “truth claims.” Unfortunate-
ly, at times, these Working Groups (and I) lost sight of this and became 
prisoners of our own internal logic. As a consequence, we did not attend 
sufficiently to an important pragmatic question that normally drives law 
reform in bodies charged with enacting legal norms, whether the project 
involves is domestic legislation or transnational constructs like conven-
tions, model laws, or legislative guides. The question is this: how should 
reform be designed so that it will receive broad uptake from as many coun-
tries as possible (and having been taken up, will actually work in these 
countries)? After thirty years, I have come to the conclusion that the objec-
tive is not to design a legal regime that is the equivalent of a high-
performance F1 racing car, which requires expert drivers, expert mechan-
ics, and relatively high maintenance costs. Rather, it is to design a legal 
regime that is the equivalent of the Volkswagen “Beetle”—a serviceable, 
predictable, easy to acquire, and easy to maintain vehicle that fulfills basic 
transportation purposes. 
In making this claim I do not mean to insinuate that some States are 
“better” than others; nor do I even mean to insinuate that some legal re-
gimes are, by definition, “better” than others. My claim is different and 
flows from the recognition that legal regimes are only partly autonomous 
from their socio-economic political contexts. Every State will aim to 
enact a regime that works best for it, with the consequence that if one 
wants to negotiate a secured transactions regime that works across the 
world, it cannot be based on the assumptions, practices, and economic 
structures of a very small set of States with developed commercial re-
gimes. 
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Let me now return to Aristotle and to virtue ethics. Moral perception is 
a precondition of moral judgment. The implication is that knowledge is a 
kind of sight: if we cannot see, we cannot know; likewise, if we cannot 
know, we cannot see. Moral knowledge depends on insight. Success in 
norm migration, like success in law itself, is open to different interpreta-
tions by different people at different times in different places. Law is not 
a hierarchically organized projection of power from law giver or judge to 
law subject; nor is it, in the international context, the projection of ideol-
ogy by dominant States upon subordinated States. Law is both a constant 
process of interaction between citizens and officials, and in international 
affairs, a constant process of adjustment among States conceived in dya-
dic interaction. If we are genuinely committed to “generating interna-
tional legal norms,” then we can do no better than attend to Aristotelian 
wisdom: far from ruling the world, we will first be seeking to rule our-
selves. 
